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3 March 2011 - Morning session DCS Douglas McKenna
18 Could I call now, please, Detective Chief 19 Superintendent Douglas McKenna? 20 DETECTIVE CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT DOUGLAS McKENNA (sworn) 21 A. Douglas McKenna, Detective Chief Superintendent attached 22 to the Metropolitan Police Counter-terrorist Command. 23 Questions by MR KEITH 24 MR KEITH: Detective Chief Superintendent, you have 25 performed over the last few years, but in particular the
1 last year, two functions, have you not? You were the 2 senior investigating officer in charge of 3 Operation Theseus, the investigation of the 7 July 4 bombs, and you have also been, of course, my Lady's 5 coroner's officer responsible for the team of 6 Metropolitan Police officers who have assisted these 7 proceedings in assembling the evidence and material and 8 the documents at which we have spent some time looking. 9 A. That is correct, my Lady. 10 Q. My Lady commissioned you, as part of your role as 11 coroner's officer, to address some of the issues that 12 have arisen in the course of these proceedings insofar 13 as they arise out of the investigation into the 7 July 14 bombings and, in particular, the alleged conspirators. 15 A. That is correct, my Lady. 16 Q. Although the nature and efficacy of the investigation 17 into the 7 July bombs is outside the scope of these 18 proceedings, have you been permitted to look at some of 19 the ancillary points that have arisen? 20 A. I have done, my Lady. 21 Q. All right. Well, can we just address some of them, 22 please? You've set them out in a helpful and detailed 23 report at INQ11410. 24 Could you start, please, with page 10 [INQ11410-10] of that 25 report, with a broad outline of the investigation which
1 was codenamed Operation Theseus into the events of 2 7 July? 3 Was it, at that stage, an enormous investigation? 4 A. I think it's fair to say that the investigation into the 5 events of 7 July have probably been the largest ever 6 criminal investigation that's been conducted by the 7 Metropolitan Police. 8 Q. Some indication of the scale can be gleaned from 9 paragraph 3.3, can it not? You've set out there some 10 indication of the amount of documents generated by the 11 enquiry, by way of general documents, exhibits, police 12 actions -- that's to say, internal documented decisions 13 to take certain steps -- and statements? 14 A. That's correct. The raw statistics that are in the 15 document probably don't do justice to the effort that 16 was required, as they are merely quantitative rather 17 than qualitative. 18 Q. The outcome of the investigation was, of course, a trial 19 of certain persons who were accused of conspiring with 20 the four dead bombers. There were two trials, were 21 there not, and the outcome of those proceedings, three 22 people were acquitted of the general allegation of 23 conspiring with the four dead bombers, but two of them 24 were convicted of ancillary offences of conspiring to 25 attend a terrorist training camp and another man,
1 Khalid Khaliq, was convicted of one offence of 2 possession of material for a terrorist purpose, 3 resulting from a search of premises some time after 4 7 July 2005? 5 A. That's correct, my Lady. 6 Q. The process by which the bombers themselves came to be 7 identified is set out at page 12 [INQ11410-12]. 8 In essence, was the position this, that as soon as 9 the forensic officers, from whom my Lady has heard, 10 began to investigate the terrible aftermath of the 11 explosions, they began to find property connected to the 12 bombers in the tunnels? 13 A. That is correct, my Lady. 14 Q. Do we see there that, initially, property was found 15 relating to Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer on 16 the evening of 7 July. On the following day, on 8 July, 17 a Barclaycard in the name of Khan was found at 18 Edgware Road, and, therefore, there was a link between 19 the two scenes because of that property? 20 A. That's correct, my Lady. 21 Q. Further property was found, and then, on 9 July, 22 records -- and we've heard a great deal, of course, 23 about the records kept in relation to 24 Operation Crevice -- were checked and there was a link 25 established between Mohammed Sidique Khan whose property
1 was found in one of the tunnels -- in fact, two of the 2 tunnels -- and Khan, whose name had appeared in the 3 course of Operation Crevice? 4 A. That also is correct, my Lady. 5 Q. You've set out there in broad terms the primary concern 6 in the investigation at that stage. Was it known 7 immediately that these bombs were detonated through the 8 use of suicide bombers as opposed to remotely? 9 A. No, it was not. It was a suspicion. It was 10 a possibility that was raised at the time that the 11 scenes were initially examined on 7 July. However, it 12 was not known for certain for several days that those 13 who had detonated the devices had died themselves in the 14 incident. 15 Q. That necessarily took a few days to establish? 16 A. It did, and it's fair to say that, in those few days, we 17 weren't clear whether we were dealing with suicide 18 attacks or whether we were still in a position of where 19 we were looking for suspects who had fled from the scene 20 in a position to be able to carry out further attacks. 21 Q. Of course. We heard from Detective Sergeant Kindness, 22 who was responsible for giving evidence in relation to 23 the CCTV evidence, that King's Cross was quickly 24 identified as a possible point through which the people 25 who had -- or whom it was suspected, by that stage, had
1 detonated the bombs might have passed. Was a comparison 2 carried out or examination carried out of CCTV relating 3 to King's Cross? 4 A. It was. All the CCTV literally for the whole of the 5 network of London and a number of other locations was 6 seized on 7 July, and then the painstaking job of 7 reviewing the material commenced, and at a very early 8 stage it was considered from the actual locations of 9 each individual explosion that a common point of 10 departure could have been King's Cross. 11 Q. At the same time, the brother of Hasib Hussain, 12 Imran Hussain, reported his brother missing, and did he 13 also, in addition to reporting his brother missing, 14 inform the police that, when he had found one of 15 Hasib Hussain's earlier operational phones, as it turned 16 out, he had discovered a number or a contact on it that 17 turned out to be associated with what was then 18 discovered to be the bomb factory at 18 Alexandra Grove? 19 A. That is correct, my Lady. 20 Q. Then was a comparison conducted between images of the 21 men contained at DVLA Swansea and the CCTV? 22 A. That is correct. 23 Q. As we also know from the evidence, there was then a link 24 traced back via the CCTV to the remaining car at Luton 25 railway station, which was the Nissan Micra discovered
1 on 12 July? 2 A. That also is correct. 3 Q. Finally, to put it all in its context, my Lady heard, of 4 course, evidence read from forensic pathologists and 5 also heard evidence from an anthropologist, 6 Julie Roberts. The remains of the bombers were examined 7 and further conclusions were drawn in relation to the 8 likely proximity of those bodies to the bombs as well 9 as, of course, in relation to who they were? 10 A. That's correct. It was a developing picture over the 11 first few days with a number of different specific 12 pieces of information coming together that led us to 13 believe that those who had detonated the devices had 14 died in the attacks. 15 Q. Hydrogen peroxide. We have, of course, heard evidence 16 from, in particular, the forensic expert, Clifford Todd, 17 in relation to how the main explosive devices were 18 constructed in part from concentrated use of 19 hydrogen peroxide. 20 Your statement sets out at -- or your report sets 21 out at page 16 [INQ11410-16] how the police discovered that the 22 bombers had gone to a number of hydroponic outlets 23 from February onwards, in fact, quite a -- a very 24 substantial number of outlets were visited, some 45, and 25 that process had continued through March, April and May.
1 You've been asked to examine what regulations and 2 procedures are currently in place that govern purchases 3 of hydrogen peroxide, and have you been able to answer 4 that query? 5 A. Yes. I mean, hydrogen peroxide is a commonly used 6 chemical compound. It has utility in a number of 7 different processes. It is sold to the general public 8 at relatively reduced levels of concentration for 9 a number of over-the-counter applications. It's also 10 widely used in the chemical industry and other 11 manufacturing industry. 12 Q. It is not itself subject to regulation in terms its 13 purchase, therefore, there is no prohibition on the 14 purchase of hydrogen peroxide. But have there been 15 a number of campaigns conducted by the authorities in 16 order to make outlets -- persons who sell 17 hydrogen peroxide -- aware of the potential dangers and 18 the associations with that particular chemical? 19 A. There have. The tragic events of 7 July, as everyone 20 will be aware, was followed up two weeks later by an 21 unsuccessful bombing attempt in London as well, where 22 hydrogen peroxide was also the basis of the explosive 23 that was attempted to be used. The airline plot the 24 following year also was hydrogen peroxide-based. 25 So there was extensive work done to raise awareness
1 across manufacturers, suppliers, retailers and first 2 responders of the potential application of 3 hydrogen peroxide in a terrorist context, and there was 4 significant effort and endeavour put in to producing 5 documentation to alert those involved in the retail of 6 hydrogen peroxide, together with manufacturers and 7 police officers and other emergency service staff. 8 Q. There is detailed in your report a campaign first 9 introduced in 2005 called "Know Your Customer" campaign, 10 which appears to have involved the distribution of some 11 90,000 leaflets and posters through the industry. 12 A. That is correct. 13 Q. There is a joint industry code of conduct promoted by 14 counter-terrorism security advisers, and does that 15 entail briefings, workshops, presentations, training 16 events and the like, in order to inform the industry 17 that they must be aware of potentially suspect purchases 18 of this chemical and inform the appropriate authorities 19 if they have concerns? 20 A. That is correct. 21 Q. I think that campaign is reflected in other EU member 22 states, is that correct? 23 A. It is. I think, as a result of our own experience and 24 those of some of our international partners, the 25 campaigns that have been run here in the United Kingdom
1 have been taken up by the European Union, who are trying 2 to encourage all member states and a wider international 3 community to adopt similar campaigns of awareness. 4 Q. Is the campaign also reflected in other approaches taken 5 by the Canadian, United States and Australian police and 6 governments? 7 A. Yes, it is. 8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, is one of the problems 9 that, if you raise awareness of the potential for this 10 particular material, they just are afraid terrorists may 11 move on to another? 12 A. There is a concern with that. There are many different 13 components and many different products that can be 14 utilised to construct improvised explosive devices. 15 The ones that were used to such devastating effect 16 on 7 July, again attempted two weeks later and the 17 following year, were hydrogen peroxide-based. That is 18 a change from the situation that we encountered in the 19 1970s and 1980s, where it was predominantly ammonium 20 nitrate fertiliser-based devices, and no doubt, if the 21 door was closed on the availability of hydrogen 22 peroxide, another compound would be found and would 23 become the product of choice. 24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I was just wondering, your campaign, 25 was it to highlight awareness of this particular
1 hydrogen peroxide or is it generally that people who 2 deal in these kind of chemicals or substances should be 3 alert to unusually large orders from people who don't 4 seem to have any business ordering it? 5 So in other words, here, if these four men had 6 walked in to buy some fertiliser when they didn't run 7 a garden business or they didn't do whatever, that 8 somebody would say, "Wait a minute, this seems a bit 9 odd"? That, in other words, we're not just focusing on 10 the known substances but on substances that might 11 come -- 12 A. No, that -- the latter point is the case, that it's 13 a case of raising awareness of people in general that 14 suspicious transactions of material that could 15 potentially be utilised as precursors in explosives 16 should -- they should be more alert to who their 17 customers are, new customers ordering substantial 18 amounts in relatively strange circumstances, should at 19 least make them think, and we would encourage that they 20 contact the authorities in those circumstances. 21 MR KEITH: As you've touched upon, the campaign has extended 22 past commercial outlets to academic laboratories, to 23 schools, secondary education, and also to members of the 24 emergency services. 25 So, if they come across potential chemical
1 precursors, they will be alert to the risks and alert to 2 the potential concerns that they will give rise to? 3 A. That is correct. As well as hydrogen peroxide, there's 4 a list of about 20, 25 different compounds that could 5 potentially be precursors to explosives, and the 6 awareness campaign to all first responders -- police and 7 other emergency services -- is to alert them to the 8 potential significance of finding those items at any 9 scene that they arrive at. 10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The campaign began? Very roughly. 11 A. The campaign began after 2005 [This could have been 'roughly' a bit more specific]and has been ongoing 12 since. 13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is still going on? 14 A. It is. There are efforts now being made across Europe 15 to make the campaign truly European-wide, and, as 16 Mr Keith has alluded to, some of our international 17 partners are undertaking similar campaigns. 18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. 19 MR KEITH: Those campaigns, of course, are concerned with 20 raising general awareness and in hopefully leading to 21 the reporting of concerns to the police. 22 Is there a case to be made for encouraging outlets 23 to reduce the concentration of potential chemical 24 precursors, but, in particular, hydrogen peroxide, so 25 that it is made even more difficult to use them in the
1 nefarious ways of which we've heard? 2 A. That has been part of the ongoing negotiation that has 3 taken place with the manufacturing industry, those who 4 manufacture hydrogen peroxide and those who are 5 responsible for point of sale to the public to try to 6 reduce the concentration of hydrogen peroxide-based 7 products that are available over the counter, and that 8 has had some success. 9 Q. Would it be assisted by further impetus? 10 A. It may well do, but it already has had some success. 11 Q. Due to the hard work and industry of Mr Hay, we are 12 aware that some national legislation is in the process 13 of being considered in relation to the marketing and use 14 of explosive precursors. Is that correct? 15 A. That is correct. 16 Q. I think the position is this: that there is already 17 existing legislation concerning the sale of ammonium 18 nitrate by way of the Ammonium Nitrate Materials High 19 Nitrogen Content Safety Regulations. In essence, there 20 is an absolute restriction on the sale of ammonium 21 nitrate if it is above a certain percentage in strength? 22 A. That is correct. 23 Q. Following a programme promulgated by the European 24 council called the Stockholm programme, and an EU-wide 25 action plan on explosives, was there brought into effect
1 in Europe a regulation on the marketing and use of 2 explosive precursors? 3 A. Yes, that is correct. 4 Q. Is that now under consideration by the House of Commons 5 European Scrutiny Committee, but I think it has not yet 6 passed into local domestic law? 7 A. That is my understanding. 8 Q. So -- 9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, are explosive precursors 10 defined as in particular ones, or is it a generic for 11 any substance that might be used in an explosive? 12 Because we all know from the drugs world that the minute 13 we ban one drug, they find another composition. 14 A. Yes, human ingenuity sometimes works against us. No, it 15 does -- I believe -- my understanding is it specifies 16 individual chemical compounds as explosive precursors 17 rather than a general catch-all. 18 MR KEITH: My Lady, they include substances of particular 19 concentration such as hydrogen peroxide, nitric acid, 20 potassium chlorate, potassium chloride, sodium chloride 21 and so on, and ammonium nitrate as well. So there is 22 obviously a list of specific compounds of a certain 23 concentration, and they would be caught by the 24 regulation, if and when it passes into domestic law. 25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So that means that that would be good
1 for the time being until some -- 2 MR KEITH: It looks like a fairly comprehensive list and, of 3 course, it will be of greater advantage than the 4 existing campaigns because it would provide for an 5 absolute prohibition on the purchase or sale of such 6 products without a licence, and I think it builds, 7 therefore, on the existing position. 8 A. That's correct. 9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. 10 MR KEITH: The next topic, please, if I may, is the 11 inception of the plot. 12 One of the issues which has been explored in the 13 course of these proceedings is when it is likely that 14 the bombers conceived their plan to detonate explosive 15 devices in the London Transport system. 16 The view of the Metropolitan Police, consistent with 17 the way in which the indictment was drafted in the 18 Operation Theseus trials, is that there is nothing to 19 suggest that the plot was conceived before the winter of 20 2004 when, of course, Khan was in Pakistan. 21 A. That is correct and, of course, it needs to be pointed 22 out that that indictment would only have been drawn in 23 consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service, having 24 regard to all the evidence in the case, that the 25 earliest possible point that any evidence indicated that
1 this plot may have been formulated was in the latter 2 stages of 2004. 3 Q. You point to certain aspects of the evidence that 4 my Lady's heard in these proceedings: namely, the 5 absence of anything relating to the travel of Khan and 6 Shakil to Pakistan in July of 2003 to suggest that there 7 was a plot at that stage, the absence of any reference 8 in the course of Crevice in February or March 2004 to 9 suggest that Khan was considering a plot at that stage 10 and, of course, to the home video dated 15 November 2004 11 which appeared to indicate that he was going abroad 12 forever because he says goodbye on the video to his 13 daughter? 14 A. That is correct and I think, much as, I think, in 15 evidence, much of the material from the transcript of 16 the audio probe from Operation Crevice tends to indicate 17 that Khan's intention was to travel overseas later that 18 year to fight Jihad abroad, in his words, which seems to 19 be consistent with his travel patterns later in 2004. 20 Q. But the plan changed because, according to his wife's 21 diary, he contacted her on a number of occasions 22 in November 2004 and January 2005 and the possibility of 23 his return arose, and then, in January, it was confirmed 24 that he was coming back to the United Kingdom? 25 A. That's correct, my Lady.
1 MR KEITH: My Lady, is that a convenient point? 2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is, thank you. 2.05. 3 (12.58 pm) 4 (The short adjournment) 5
3 March 2011 - Afternoon session DCS Douglas McKenna (continued)
3 March 2011 - Morning session [Actually it's afternoon]
1 (2.05 pm) 2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith? 3 MR KEITH: Deputy Chief Superintendent, you will recall that 4 Mrs Waugh, Sylvia Waugh, I think the very first witness 5 spoke of the group of males outside her address in the 6 very early hours of 7 July 2005 and she made reference 7 in the course of her evidence to a white car, an older 8 white car. 9 Could you just detail for my Lady what steps were 10 taken by the Metropolitan Police to try to trace whether 11 there was any white car that might have been associated 12 at all with the affairs of the bombers that morning? 13 A. Certainly. 14 The area described by the witness Sylvia Waugh 15 wasn't directly covered by any CCTV, so extensive CCTV 16 material, where it existed, across the whole of the area 17 was seized, attempting to identify any white car that 18 may have had a connection with that area at that time in 19 the early morning of 7 July, and none was seen. 20 The only potential car that was identified was 21 a white Toyota Corolla car that was ultimately traced to 22 a driver who delivered for a local takeaway restaurant 23 and whilst he couldn't say for certain whether he had 24 been in that area at that time on 7 July, he couldn't 25 discount it.
1 But all other efforts to trace a white car as having 2 been present on the morning of 7 July were unsuccessful. 3 Q. You made enquiries, did you, of the HOLMES system, the 4 vast computer system operated by the 5 Metropolitan Police, you made house-to-house enquiries, 6 you made enquiries into possible white cars in the 7 ownership of family members or associates of the 8 bombers, as well as enquiries of local car hire 9 companies and enquiries on the police national computer? 10 A. That's correct. I think we exhausted all potential 11 lines of enquiry in an attempt to try to identify 12 whether a white car could be established. 13 Q. She made reference, of course, also to somebody whom she 14 described as "the Jamaican" and we are, of course, aware 15 that Jermaine Lindsay travelled to Luton railway station 16 in his own car, and therefore wasn't there that morning. 17 A. That's correct. From reviewing the CCTV material from 18 the station car park at Luton, I believe the time that 19 his car, with him driving, was seen to arrive was at 20 about 5.00 am, and our belief is that he travelled there 21 from Aylesbury and, therefore, our assessment is he 22 couldn't possibly have been in the vicinity of 23 Alexandra Grove at the time Sylvia Waugh said that she 24 saw a Jamaican man. 25 It may well be that her recollection is conflated
1 with that of another day, because we are satisfied that 2 he did attend that premises at some point. 3 Q. Indeed, her reference to at least six males may have 4 been erroneous, because there was nothing from the CCTV 5 or any of the other evidence to suggest that there were 6 as many as six males leaving that address that morning? 7 A. That is correct. 8 Q. She made also reference to somebody whom she described 9 as an Egyptian. One of the persons of interest -- 10 that's to say persons of whom enquiries were made -- was 11 a man called Magdy El-Nasher, who held, I think, the 12 leasehold of the premises at 18 Alexandra Grove. 13 Were considerable enquiries, a considerable number 14 of enquiries, carried out in relation to him, in 15 particular in relation to whether or not he was part of 16 the conspiracy hatched at Alexandra Grove? 17 A. That's correct, extensive enquiries were made concerning 18 what part, if any, Mr Magdy El-Nasher may have played in 19 any conspiracy. He was eliminated from the enquiry 20 subsequent to the events of 7 July. 21 He was seen, a letter of request was sent to the 22 Egyptian authorities, he was interviewed in the presence 23 of officers from the Operation Theseus enquiry, he 24 agreed to provide voluntarily biometric samples, which 25 were compared against outstanding forensic samples and
1 he was eliminated from the enquiry. 2 Q. Was there subsequently a further interview process at 3 the request of the Metropolitan Police and, as a result 4 of those further interviews, was the assessment 5 unaltered, which was that he would, if he were to be in 6 this country, be considered to be a significant witness 7 rather than a suspect on the basis of the material then 8 available? 9 A. That's correct, my Lady. 10 Q. The issue of the white car was addressed further in the 11 context of Luton railway station, was it not, because 12 Detective Sergeant, or Detective Inspector now, Kindness 13 reviewed the CCTV material to see whether or not there 14 was any trace of a white car at Luton either? 15 A. That is correct. In fact, the CCTV material that was 16 seized that would have covered the entire journey from 17 Leeds to Luton was reviewed, and at no stage was there 18 any suggestion that there was another vehicle in convoy 19 with the Micra. The Micra arrived solely at Luton 20 railway station and there was no sign of a white car 21 arriving there. 22 Q. In relation to just the two cars then that appeared to 23 be associated at Luton, there was some evidence to 24 suggest a confusion or a lack of clarity as to how many 25 men were in those two cars, because you will recall that
1 Susan Clarke, the witness, made reference in her 2 original diagram that she provided to the police to the 3 possibility of a fifth male being present, and you'll 4 remember that she noted a question mark on her original 5 diagram. 6 Was very careful consideration given by the police 7 to the CCTV to see whether or not the possibility of 8 a fifth man could be resolved? 9 A. Yes, it was. A brief chronology was that 10 Jermaine Lindsay arrives at Luton railway station in the 11 hours past 5.00 am on his own. He's there for 12 a considerable period before the Nissan Micra arrives 13 containing three individuals. 14 They are then, together, parked next to each other 15 in the car park at Luton railway station, where there is 16 interaction between them as a group of four at the rear 17 of the cars, and then there are other cars arriving 18 during the -- that period of time, which is about 7.20 19 in the morning, all of whom have been identified as 20 legitimate commuters and there is nothing to suggest 21 there was any contact between the four bombers and any 22 other person at Luton railway station car park. 23 Q. The three men in the Nissan were seen at Woodall service 24 station, were they not, and there were three men there? 25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. In relation to Jermaine Lindsay in the red Fiat Brava, 2 my Lady heard a statement from Mohammed Okasheh, who was 3 the man who issued the parking penalty. He made 4 reference only to there being one man asleep in the car? 5 A. That's correct, and it is quite clear from the CCTV, 6 albeit in the early hours of the morning, and not of 7 particularly great quality, but it's clear that there is 8 one individual associated with the Fiat Brava. 9 Q. Was a very detailed analysis of the CCTV carried out 10 again quite recently, in the course of these 11 proceedings, to eliminate, yet again, any possibility of 12 any of the people who had gone past the two cars being 13 associated with them? So although there was a man in 14 a BMW who arrived at 6.58, was he seen subsequently on 15 the CCTV as having got on to the train at platform 1, 16 and left -- 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. -- not with the bombers? 19 A significant person, too, who arrived at 7.19 and 20 parked near to the cars was subsequently seen to be 21 still on platform 3 at the station after the bombers had 22 gone. 23 And was a third significant person, again whose car 24 had parked near the other two cars -- the two cars with 25 which we're concerned -- also eliminated from the
1 enquiry because they, too, were seen to be on the 2 station platforms separate from the bombers and, in 3 fact, still to be there once the bombers had departed 4 from Luton? 5 A. All those points are correct. 6 Q. The evidence then of Benedict Leech and Karl Sylvester, 7 they were the witnesses who gave evidence of the travel 8 of the bombers to London. 9 Is it the assessment of the Metropolitan Police -- 10 although the evidence, of course, is entirely a matter 11 for my Lady -- that there is no other material or no 12 material at all to support the assertion that there were 13 any other men associated with the bombers on the way 14 down to King's Cross? 15 A. That is correct. 16 Q. Is that the conclusion that you set out at 17 paragraph 7.16 on page 28? 18 A. That is correct. 19 Q. Bomb-making, next, please. Page 29 [INQ11410-29], if we can have that 20 on the screen. 21 You refer to the evidence given to my Lady from 22 Clifford Todd who spoke of his view that it wasn't 23 feasible for the bombs to have been created without some 24 initial guidance or instruction and, is this the 25 position: that there is no evidence in the possession of
1 the police to suggest that any of the four bombers 2 received specialised bomb-making training in the 3 United Kingdom or in any way supervised in the 4 construction of the bombs whilst in the United Kingdom? 5 A. That also is correct. 6 Q. The police, of course, are aware of the evidence in 7 a way we could not be, it has always been your view, has 8 it not, that the link to Pakistan provides some 9 suggestion of training, the specialised nature required, 10 as having been undertaken in Pakistan? 11 A. That's correct. 12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What about the bomb expert from 13 Canada? 14 A. I think our assessment in relation to Momin Khawaja is 15 that his role in the Crevice plot was to provide the 16 electronics capability to be able to devise a remote, 17 radio-controlled initiating mechanism rather than in the 18 construction of the explosives themselves. 19 MR KEITH: You will recall that Witness G referred, of 20 course, to material from probes utilised in the course 21 of Operation Crevice at the latter end of February 2004, 22 which made a reference to that sort of specialised 23 bomb-making equipment -- 24 A. That's correct. 25 Q. -- while Khawaja was here?
1 You then turn to the operational phones used by the 2 bombers, page 31, and to the evidence that my Lady has 3 heard concerning the links between the operational 4 phones and Pakistan. 5 Were enquiries made to try to see whether or not 6 anybody could be identified as having made those calls? 7 A. Yes, enquiries were raised with authorities in Pakistan 8 to identify the locations from where those phone calls 9 were being made, and they were established to be public 10 call offices. 11 I think it's important to understand that a public 12 call office in Pakistan is very often an informal 13 establishment that provides telephone services to large 14 numbers of people. They are not particularly 15 well-regulated, and records that are kept are generally 16 kept for the purpose of making sure people pay the 17 appropriate amount for the call rather than for any 18 other official purpose. 19 And it would not be unsurprising to find crowds of 20 people waiting to use PCOs in Pakistan. 21 Q. Radicalisation. Part of your report deals with the Iqra 22 bookshop and the Hamara Centre with which it was 23 associated. 24 We heard some evidence from, I think, 25 West Yorkshire Police -- I'll be corrected if I'm
1 wrong -- concerning the searches that were carried out 2 on the Iqra bookshop after 7/7; that is to say, between 3 15 and 19 July 2005. 4 Is this the position, as we heard during the 5 evidence, that, although a vast amount of material was 6 seized and searched, and although some of it was highly 7 distressing, indeed deeply unpleasant, there was nothing 8 that was found to indicate evidence of a connection to 9 extremist activity in the sense of acts preparatory to 10 acts of terrorism? 11 A. That's correct, and I think it's important to draw the 12 distinction between material that is radical, material 13 that is extreme and material that encourages, directs, 14 advocates the use of violence in furtherance of 15 extremism. 16 None of the material which was seized at the 17 searches fell into the latter category, and none of the 18 material in itself would have formed the basis of any 19 criminal charge. 20 Q. And no charges were brought in relation to those 21 seizures. The material, as you've observed, in relation 22 to which Khalid Khaliq was convicted, related to a later 23 search conducted some two years later? 24 A. That is correct. 25 Q. You, of course, are aware, Detective Chief
1 Superintendent, of the evidence, in particular from 2 Mr Hargreaves, concerning the distribution of extremist 3 material from the Iqra bookshop, and you will recall the 4 reference to distribution of material, I think to 5 Glasgow and to the north of the country. 6 Was any such extremist material found during the 7 search in July 2005? 8 A. Not that I can recollect. I don't believe so. 9 Q. Enquiries were carried out, were they not, into the Iqra 10 bookshop and, in particular, its finances? 11 A. That is correct, and recently, in fact, a report has 12 been published by the Charities Commission with whom 13 a joint investigation was subsequently mounted. 14 Q. The police themselves didn't carry out detailed 15 financial checks, did they, of the Iqra bookshop, but 16 there was some exploration of its financial situation? 17 A. That is correct. 18 Q. Why were further, more detailed checks, using, perhaps, 19 production orders and court authorised searches, not 20 carried out? 21 A. At the time, following the searches, it was clear that, 22 although the Iqra bookshop had been a place where some 23 of those involved in the attacks on 7 July had met, 24 there was nothing found there which in itself inherently 25 formed the basis of any criminal activity.
1 It was then we were keen to pursue and to establish 2 or eliminate whether any of the funding that had gone 3 through the Iqra bookshop had been used to assist in 4 financing the attacks of 7 July. 5 Q. Because Operation Theseus was an investigation into the 6 attacks on 7 July, not a wider investigation into 7 potential extremism in the Dewsbury area? 8 A. That is correct. 9 Q. The Charities Commission report into Iqra has now been 10 concluded, and although I don't think it's publicly 11 available yet, the process is complete, and you've been 12 able to say in your report briefly that it revealed some 13 indication of material of an extremist nature being 14 available at the bookshop, but, again, nothing that 15 would have given rise to criminal charges and there was 16 some financial mismanagement in terms of the failure to 17 file accounts to the Charities Commission and to account 18 for the residual funds that were in its accounts when 19 the police raided it? 20 A. That's correct, I am under the impression that the 21 report is now available. I think it was published on 22 the 22nd. 23 Q. I think it's been formally concluded and released, but 24 I don't know that it's been disseminated and made 25 publicly available. We have certainly seen a copy of
1 it, but is that a fair summary of its conclusions? 2 A. It is, yes. 3 Q. The Hamara Centre was obviously associated with the Iqra 4 bookshop and there were a number of associations through 5 the people of whom we've heard -- Khalid Khaliq, 6 Sadeer Saleem, Khan himself, Tanweer and Hussain. Were 7 those premises also searched in July 2005? 8 A. That is correct, they were, on 14 July. 9 Q. Was there anything discovered in the course of that 10 search that indicated that extremist material or 11 evidence preparatory to acts of terrorism was on the 12 premises? 13 A. No, there was no evidence at all. 14 Q. It's plain from the evidence that Mohammed Sidique Khan 15 and Shehzad Tanweer were concerned, in their travel to 16 Pakistan, with terrorist-related activity. 17 Were steps taken to try to see whether their steps, 18 their location in Pakistan, and their activities, could 19 be ascertained? 20 A. They were. Attempts were made with colleagues in 21 Pakistan to attempt to identify precisely what Khan and 22 Tanweer had been engaged in whilst there. However, 23 there was no evidence, no eyewitness reports and nothing 24 that could progress the enquiry. 25 Q. It's obvious, is it not, that it would be incredibly
1 difficult to try to find evidence relating to activities 2 in so-called training camps. It's not something that 3 admits to the production of evidence? 4 A. No, not widely publicised, no. 5 Q. There was some material, was there not, by way of 6 statements taken from the maternal uncles of Tanweer, to 7 try to ascertain their location, where they were, in the 8 course of the time that they were in Pakistan? 9 The dates provided by Tanweer's relatives were not 10 internally inconsistent, but they didn't provide a full 11 picture, and could not provide a full picture of where 12 they had been throughout their time in Pakistan? 13 A. That is correct. 14 Q. The next subject, please, the martyrdom recordings, 15 so-called. 16 The one in relation to Mohammed Sidique Khan was 17 broadcast by Al Jazeera on 2 September 2005. We have 18 seen, in the course of these proceedings, an edited 19 version of it. In particular, it omitted the 20 accompanying speech of Al-Zawahiri, the then second in 21 command of Al-Qaeda, as well as offensive and unpleasant 22 reconstructions of the detonation of explosives in the 23 Underground. 24 Were steps taken to try to ascertain when that video 25 was made?
1 A. Only in as far as a careful examination of the product 2 that was broadcast was undertaken. Steps weren't taken 3 to try to discover the means by which the agency that 4 broadcast the material came by it, but you -- 5 Q. Was there anything about the sound or the way in which 6 the video was recorded that indicated its origin? 7 A. There was a careful analysis undertaken, but I think the 8 person who undertook it is quite candid in saying that 9 this is an area of science, expertise, that doesn't 10 really exist, it's only using his best possible judgment 11 and, whilst he was being able to give an assessment of 12 what the room may have been like in which the recording 13 was made, there is nothing he can add to what geographic 14 location it was made in, albeit it is self-evident that 15 the only two videos that were released have been 16 released by two men that we know travelled to Pakistan 17 and the two accomplices that didn't travel, there is no 18 material in relation to them. 19 Q. So would that aspect, that feature, tend to negate the 20 supposition from Mr Gilbertson that the recordings may 21 have been made at the Iqra bookshop in the video editing 22 suite that was apparently located on the top floor? 23 A. I think they do, yes. 24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: One would assume that, given these 25 videos are made by people who are very often being
1 hunted, they become quite expert at hiding the 2 background and anything that might betray their 3 location? 4 A. I think quite correct, my Lady. [But MSK and Tanweer weren't being hunted, and if they intended to die, why bother covering tracks?] 5 MR KEITH: A completely separate subject, please, then, the 6 semi-automatic handgun, telescopic sight and bullets 7 found in the boot of the Fiat Brava. You will recall, 8 Detective Chief Superintendent, that evidence was given 9 about the DNA links, in particular, between the 10 handle -- the handle of the handgun and some of the 11 bullets that linked them to Jermaine Lindsay. 12 Were tests done to see whether or not there was any 13 connection between the handgun and the ammunition found 14 and any other offences on police databases? 15 A. That's correct, analysis was conducted by the Forensic 16 Science Service to see whether bullets from that gun or 17 bullets that matched the bullets we recovered had been 18 used in any criminal offence relating to handguns in the 19 United Kingdom with a negative result. 20 Q. Finally, some very brief issues, if I may. 21 Over the years, there have been a number of 22 suppositions and views expressed as to the causes of the 23 7 July bombs and their location. 24 The ISC, the Intelligence and Security Committee, 25 made some observations and reached some very firm
1 findings in relation to some aspects of the theories 2 that have been generated over the years. Some of them 3 are touched upon in your report and they have also been 4 the subject of considerable evidence before my Lady. 5 You address them only to dismiss them summarily. 6 May I just list them? 7 There was nothing ever found to suggest that the 8 explosions were connected to or caused in any way by 9 a power surge. 10 There was nothing to suggest that the explosions 11 ever took place under the trains in the case of the 12 three trains. 13 There was nothing to suggest that the explosions 14 were in any way connected with exercises or terrorism 15 training exercises being carried out at any time in 16 advance of 7 July. 17 A. That is correct. 18 Q. And there is nothing to suggest, and nor has there ever 19 been anything to suggest, that these devices were 20 exploded in any other way other than by the four suicide 21 bombers? 22 A. That also is correct, my Lady. 23 Q. In addition, you have examined in your report, in 24 a supplemental report in fact, whether or not there is 25 anything by way of fingerprint, DNA or handwriting
1 evidence to support the notion that there may have been 2 anybody else closely connected with the four bombers on 3 the morning of their travel to London on 7 July. 4 A. That is correct. 5 Q. There was nothing to suggest that the unknown profiles 6 were of such significance -- because, obviously, there 7 were some unexplained fingerprints and handwriting from 8 people who may long in the past have used those cars or 9 been given lifts in them quite innocently -- but there 10 was nothing to suggest that there was anything 11 significant in any of those profiles that led you to 12 believe that they were involved that morning? 13 A. That is correct. 14 Q. The second matter and the last matter, in fact, in your 15 supplemental report concerns port and border controls. 16 You were asked to address this topic by one of the 17 interested persons, and my Lady consented that you 18 should address this issue also. 19 The Terrorism Act 2000 introduced powers for police 20 officers, immigration officers and certain customs 21 officers to stop, question and detain any person who is 22 believed or suspected to be concerned with the 23 commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 24 terrorism? 25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. Do they have a power to detain for up to nine hours, in 2 effect, therefore, to stop them travelling? 3 A. Yes, they do. 4 Q. You also go on to deal with certain powers contained in 5 the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, control orders 6 which we are, of course, aware only came into force 7 in March 2005, as well as the powers under the 8 Terrorism Act 2006 and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. 9 A. That is correct. 10 Q. May I finally return to your role as coroner's officer. 11 Could I please have on the screen INQ11438 [INQ11438-1] ? I think 12 it would be remiss of me if I didn't acknowledge through 13 you, Detective Chief Superintendent, the names and the 14 number, in fact, of police officers who have assisted 15 you in the carrying out of your function as coroner's 16 officer. 17 Do we see there the list of the investigation team, 18 the analysts and the major incident room staff, all of 19 whom have assisted in the compilation of the evidence 20 adduced before my Lady and in the vast number of 21 enquiries that have been carried out in the course of 22 these proceedings? 23 A. Yes, that's the small body of personnel that I've been 24 relying upon. 25 Q. Many of them, of course, were involved in the original
1 investigation, Operation Theseus, but have some of them 2 been employed virtually full-time to address the issues 3 arising in the course of these inquests? 4 A. They have, yes. 5 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I also be permitted at this juncture 6 to acknowledge the identity of your own Secretariat in 7 relation to whom a list has similarly been compiled, 8 INQ11395 [INQ11395-1]. You have, of course, Officer, worked very 9 closely with the members of my Lady's Secretariat in 10 addressing the many issues which have arisen and which 11 have been addressed in the course of these proceedings. 12 Thank you very much, I've no further questions. 13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders, Ms Sheff? 14 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady. 15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson? 16 Questions by MR PATTERSON 17 MR PATTERSON: I'm grateful, my Lady. 18 Detective Chief Superintendent, may I express our 19 gratitude for the detail in your two reports addressing 20 these various topics that relate broadly to the four 21 dead bombers, and can I cover, I hope very briefly, 22 a number of distinct topics? 23 First of all, how the investigation that began on 24 7 July led you to Luton railway station and the 25 identification of the four bombers.
1 Do I understand it was as follows: that the 2 documents and the names of the four bombers that were 3 found at the scene; the finding of the CCTV footage of 4 the group of four at King's Cross station moving through 5 the tunnel that connects the Thameslink station to the 6 main station, that was the next stage in the 7 investigation, is that right? 8 A. That's correct. 9 Q. The reporting by Hussain's family that he was missing 10 and the link to Alexandra Grove, which you've referred 11 to this morning. Is that right? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. So from that footage that you had of the men in the 14 Thameslink tunnel in particular, you were able, with the 15 assistance of photographs from the DVLA to identify 16 I think three of them: MSK, Tanweer and Hussain? 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. Is that right? And although you had already identified 19 the link with Operation Crevice and the mention of Khan 20 in that investigation, I think the fruits of that 21 investigation didn't assist you in identifying his 22 involvement on 7 July; it was fresh analysis, really, 23 from scratch, on 7 July? 24 A. It really was from 7 July moving forward that we were 25 able to identify the involvement of the four bombers.
1 You've already outlined, I think, most of the main 2 threads of investigation that led to us Luton railway 3 station and it's -- it was a fortuitous coincidence 4 that, on the day that we had discovered the CCTV from 5 Luton railway station, we, of course, were assisted by 6 the coming forward of some witnesses from Luton, from 7 whom you have heard, who raised with us the suspicious 8 activity they'd seen in relation to the cars that 9 morning. 10 Q. In relation to the photographs, presumably those three 11 photographs from the DVLA were of sufficient quality to 12 be able to confirm that the images on the CCTV were 13 indeed Khan, Tanweer and Hussain? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Presumably, you got to Luton railway station simply by 16 considering that they may have come in a southerly 17 direction down the Thameslink line from one of the 18 stations north of London? 19 A. I think from the examination of the CCTV at King's Cross 20 we were able to see they had come from the southbound 21 platform at King's Cross Thameslink at what was then the 22 King's Cross Thameslink station, which was slightly up 23 Pentonville Road, and then, from the platform CCTV, that 24 they had alighted from a train which was travelling 25 southbound.
1 It was then a good guess that Luton might have been 2 one of the locations to look at. Luton, Bedford, 3 St Albans and Harpenden being the main stations that 4 service that line in the morning. 5 Q. Then the enquiries at those stations led to the finding 6 of the footage at Luton that we've seen, the well-known 7 footage of the men with their rucksacks leaving the car 8 park and eventually getting on to the train? 9 A. That's correct, my Lady. 10 Q. How did you identify the fourth man, Jermaine Lindsay? 11 Because obviously you saw in the footage, both at 12 King's Cross and at Luton, that there was this fourth 13 man whose appearance was fairly clear and his clothing 14 and his ethnic origins and so forth. How did you 15 identify him as being Jermaine Lindsay? 16 A. My recollection of the chronology of that was in 17 relation to the viewing of the CCTV material from the 18 car park at Luton, it identified the fourth man who had 19 met with the other three, having come from a car parked 20 next to it. 21 When the CCTV from the days moving forward from the 22 7 July was reviewed, it was noticed that that Fiat Brava 23 had, in fact, been removed by a vehicle removal company 24 on behalf of Bedfordshire Police, and Jermaine Lindsay 25 was associated with that vehicle as the registered
1 keeper. 2 Q. Then finally on this topic, the remains of the bodies 3 you've already explained how the evidence from the 4 pathologists indicated that the four remains in question 5 were likely to have been very close to the explosions, 6 and I think DNA testing ultimately confirmed that those 7 remains matched the DNA samples that were obtained in 8 relation to the four men? 9 A. That's correct. I think it's also important to say 10 that, in the days prior to the pathologists' 11 examination, there had already been some speculation 12 from the -- from point one, one of the explosives 13 officers raised it as a potential because of the 14 significant disruption to one of the bodies at one of 15 the scenes, and the crime scene examiners had raised it 16 as a potential, but it was not until the pathology and 17 anthropology was conducted that we were able to say with 18 any certainty that they had been suicide bombings. 19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: One of the things presumably that 20 alerted you is there's no evidence of any remote 21 detonating device? 22 A. No, that's right. There was no electronic circuitry 23 board[Yes there was] or any material as such to suggest that there was 24 anything other than a very short fuse. 25 MR PATTERSON: As we know already, the various documents in
1 the names of the bombers that were found close to but 2 slightly removed from the seats of each of the 3 explosions? 4 A. That's correct, Mr Patterson. 5 Q. The evidence that you dealt with with Mr Keith in 6 relation to whether there's material that might suggest 7 they were accompanied on the day by, perhaps, a fifth 8 person, I think we can take this briefly, but first, 9 dealing with the evidence up in Leeds in the early hours 10 from Sylvia Waugh, does it come to this: that, although 11 she said that there were at least six males outside the 12 address, the bomb factory, that all lines of 13 investigation into whether there were others were 14 unsuccessful in that you couldn't identify any others 15 assisting them on the morning? 16 A. That's correct, my Lady. 17 Q. She said in her statement -- you deal with this in your 18 report at page 23 [INQ11410-23] -- that there were, in fact, four men 19 who got into the Nissan Micra as it set off on its 20 journey south. 21 Now, obviously, the CCTV material, as you've 22 indicated, suggests that there were only three in that 23 Nissan Micra. Is it your conclusion that it's likely 24 that she was simply wrong about that? 25 A. Yes, it is. By the time the vehicle arrived at the
1 service station where it stopped, where the CCTV footage 2 was taken at Woodall Services, there are certainly only 3 three persons within the vehicle. 4 Q. Then, as we follow the evidence through the course of 5 the morning at Luton railway station, the 6 reconsideration of the footage showed one person who 7 lingered between the two cars, round about the time that 8 the four bombers made off with their rucksacks, and 9 I think it was checked and it was concluded, wasn't it, 10 that there was, in fact, a parking ticket machine next 11 to the cars that is likely to be the explanation for 12 that fifth image, that fifth person standing near the 13 cars? 14 A. That's correct. The crossover time between that car 15 with that individual arriving, being in the same 16 location as the four bombers, is about five seconds and, 17 in the course of that period, there is no interaction 18 between the driver of that car and the four bombers, and 19 you're accurate in saying that there is a ticket machine 20 immediately next to where that vehicle parked and 21 further review of it shows that that individual took 22 a different route to the station than the four bombers. 23 Q. Then, on the train south down to London, Mr Keith has 24 mentioned the witnesses who gave accounts of the bombers 25 during the journey: a Mr Leech and a Mr Sylvester.
1 I think from the report, Mr McKenna, it's your 2 conclusion, isn't it, that it's likely that the group 3 divided into two carriages, two men in each carriage, is 4 that right? 5 A. Certainly from the CCTV, both at Luton and on arrival at 6 King's Cross, it looks as if they had broken into two 7 pairs. 8 Q. The suggestion, at that stage of the day, that there 9 might be a fifth person, really comes from the evidence 10 of Mr Leech that, in relation to the two men that he saw 11 in his carriage, they were talking with the third 12 person, who was also a young Asian male. 13 Have you any reason to suppose that that third 14 person in that carriage was in any way assisting or 15 accompanying the men on the morning? 16 A. None at all. One thing that does -- that struck me when 17 I watched the CCTV myself is the number of people 18 alighting that train wearing backpacks in the middle 19 of July in London. 20 Q. Then perhaps the final evidence on this distinct topic, 21 I suppose, would be Joseph Martoccia, the witness who 22 saw the group at King's Cross railway station shortly 23 before the explosions. 24 If you remember, he gave rather graphic evidence of 25 a team of four to six men hugging and I think the word,
1 from memory, that he used was they seemed to have 2 a "euphoric" mood, and you probably recall that 3 evidence. 4 A. I recall the evidence, but we have found nothing that 5 suggests there was anything other than the distinct 6 group of four men. 7 Q. I hope I've identified the various strands that might 8 suggest accompanied by a fifth person. Having 9 considered it carefully and, in particular, the CCTV at 10 Luton and Thameslink tunnel, is it your conclusion that 11 the four men were on their own? 12 A. It is. I think the CCTV, together with the 13 communications data, together with the forensic evidence 14 and all other enquiries suggest the four men were on 15 their own from the point that they left Luton railway 16 station. 17 Q. Another distinct topic, please, Mr McKenna. Liquid 18 oxygen purchases. You've dealt very helpfully with the 19 procedures that have been introduced since 2005 with the 20 intention of raising awareness amongst, in particular, 21 retailers as to the dual uses of hydrogen peroxide and 22 liquid oxygen. 23 We heard evidence from Detective Constable Reynolds 24 about this to the effect that it is, however, still 25 possible to make large purchases without detection, and
1 those various procedures that have been introduced, they 2 don't actually impose, do they, any statutory duty or 3 requirement on the part of a retailer to notify any 4 suspicious customers or any suspicious purchasers? 5 A. No, that is correct, and I think it must be remembered 6 as well that hydrogen peroxide has a large number of 7 legitimate uses. 8 Unfortunately, it does also have some illegitimate 9 uses, particularly around the hydroponic growing and 10 cultivation of cannabis. So there is an illicit grey 11 market and a number of establishments that sell on to 12 people in the full knowledge that it's being used in 13 cannabis production. 14 So it is very difficult to control the sales of 15 hydrogen peroxide. 16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Presumably, too, you can alert the 17 owners or managers of a shop or outlet but their staff 18 are likely to be on the move and -- 19 A. Yes. 20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You have a sort of floating 21 population of salespeople, I would have thought. 22 A. That's correct, my Lady, and also where we have this 23 illicit nature to the sale of hydrogen peroxide because 24 of its utility for the illegal cultivation of cannabis, 25 even if the point of retail isn't prepared to alert us
1 to suspicious transactions, we hope, by moving up the 2 chain to the distributors and manufacturers, they will 3 identify that there are significant additional purchases 4 taking place through one outlet. 5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You say there are a number of 6 legitimate uses. I can see that for certain quantities 7 of hydrogen peroxide. Are there lots of legitimate uses 8 for large quantities? 9 A. Yes, I think in the chemical industry, in bleaching of 10 wood, in manufacturing processes, but then their supply 11 chain will look very different to that which is sold 12 through retail outlets in the street. 13 MR PATTERSON: Indeed, there were various witness statements 14 taken from the retailers in this particular case who 15 made the sales in the spring of 2005 or, indeed, in some 16 cases, who indicated to the police that there were 17 requests for large quantities. They might have queried 18 that with whoever it was -- Tanweer or MSK or whoever -- 19 and that they didn't come back on the next occasion 20 after the order had been placed and the extra quantities 21 had been brought in. 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. It's right, isn't it, that one of those retailers, it 24 actually went through his mind that it might be 25 something that was intended for explosives and he
1 jokingly said to the Asian male who came in and asked 2 for 10 five-litre quantities, "Do you know you can make 3 explosives with that?" 4 A. Yes, it seems, in hindsight, a strange but prophetic 5 remark. 6 Q. None of these retailers notified the police and, as 7 you've indicated today there is no obligation to notify 8 the police. 9 We've helpfully heard today that there is draft 10 legislation being considered at the moment by the Home 11 Office. Would you, Mr McKenna, welcome any further 12 tightening of sales in this area? 13 A. It is always a difficult balance between restricting 14 free trade, commerce and introducing additional 15 restrictions. I think the awareness campaign has gone 16 some way and I think the proposed legislation hopefully 17 will deal with anything else that is necessary. 18 Q. A separate but linked topic, the freely available 19 material on the internet that gives surprisingly 20 detailed information about bomb-making ingredients and 21 techniques. 22 We heard about this from Detective Constable 23 Reynolds and from the expert, Clifford Todd. Both of 24 them confirmed the availability of this sort of 25 material.
1 Are you aware of any plans to try to address this 2 problem or can you, yourself, suggest any means of 3 addressing this problem? 4 A. Where the material in itself that is published on the 5 internet constitutes a criminal offence, it is possible 6 to take action. It's possible to bring prosecutions 7 against those who are loading it, downloading it, making 8 use of it, where possession of the material may be an 9 offence. 10 Q. Under the Terrorist Act? 11 A. Under the Terrorism Act or where it's malicious 12 communications under malicious communication 13 legislation. 14 Where the information in itself isn't a criminal 15 offence, it becomes very difficult to regulate and, 16 again, we are in that very fine balance between freedom 17 of speech, freedom of expression, and censorship. 18 So I know it is something that is under constant 19 discussion, both within the UK and globally, because the 20 internet is a global phenomenon, that -- I think all 21 that can be done is being done. 22 Obviously, there are concerns where that material is 23 posted in foreign jurisdictions who may not have similar 24 legislation to ourselves. It becomes increasingly 25 difficult to regulate.
1 But where there is access provided in the UK and 2 people are accessing material the possession of which 3 constitutes an offence, there is adequate legislation to 4 deal with it. 5 Q. The Iqra bookshop. You've mentioned Khalid Khaliq, one 6 of the individuals linked to that shop, who is a trustee 7 and who you told us pleaded guilty to a criminal 8 offence. 9 Another person closely associated both with opening 10 the bookshop and running it, and who was associated with 11 Mohammed Sidique Khan was Tafazal Mohammed. 12 Is it right that, in relation to him, after careful 13 consideration, no charges were brought or no criminal 14 offences were believed to have been committed? 15 A. I don't believe there was any criminal offences 16 disclosed in relation to Mr Mohammed. 17 Q. In relation to the type of material that was being 18 disseminated from that bookshop, I think by the time the 19 links with Leeds were made in the aftermath of 7/7, it 20 wasn't until 15 July that the search took place at the 21 Iqra bookshop, and so, is it possible that any extremist 22 or unlawful material that was held there might have been 23 removed by then? 24 A. Entirely possible. 25 Q. Before I leave that topic, you've mentioned the
1 Charities Commission and their recent enquiry into the 2 bookshop. 3 Are you aware of any changes that would be needed in 4 relation to the procedures that would allow charitable 5 status to be given or funding easily to be obtained by 6 organisations that might be involved in the 7 dissemination of extremist or unlawful material? Do you 8 know if they have addressed this issue? 9 A. I think they have. The Charities Commission report is 10 quite comprehensive in what their findings are. They 11 have been able to take specific action in relation to 12 Iqra. They have made a number of recommendations which 13 really emphasise the importance of the role of trustees 14 to a charity to ensure they are playing an active part 15 in regulating its activities. 16 Q. Thank you, Mr McKenna. 17 Then finally, please, can I deal with one last 18 topic, and that's the overseas military or terrorist 19 training camps that are believed to have been visited by 20 Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer? 21 You've touched upon this, haven't you, in your 22 report in relation to what's believed to have been the 23 case, and we've heard from other witnesses that it is 24 believed that they have on a number of occasions 25 attended such camps, and reference has been made to the
1 evidence of Mohammed Junaid Babar? 2 A. That's correct, yes. 3 Q. I think, with your assistance, and with my Lady's leave, 4 perhaps I can very briefly highlight some evidence that 5 perhaps adds a little bit more detail to those training 6 camps. 7 I think, Mr McKenna, the first occasion when it's 8 believed that there was attendance at one of those camps 9 is in 2001 on the part of MSK. Is that right? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. We've already heard from Acting Detective 12 Inspector Sparks that Witness B gave information to the 13 police tending to suggest that MSK had attended Pakistan 14 and crossed into Afghanistan and had learnt to shoot and 15 fight, and that this was before his marriage 16 in October 2001. 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. Evidence was given by Waheed Ali, at both his trials, to 19 the effect that he had been present at that camp and 20 that that is indeed what had happened in relation to 21 MSK, that he had attended this camp in, I think, 22 Kashmir. 23 A. That is also correct. 24 Q. I think from a digest of some of the evidence given in 25 those trials, can you assist us with just a little of
1 the detail of what took place at that camp? 2 A. I mean, are you talking about the camp at Malakand in 3 2003, or are you talking about the first experience 4 in -- 5 Q. Yes, the 2001 visit by MSK. Waheed Ali, also known as 6 Shipon Ullah, indicated that he was a very close friend 7 of Tanweer and, indeed, that he became radicalised by 8 viewing videos with Tanweer of so-called Muslim brothers 9 fighting and firing Kalashnikovs. 10 A. That's correct. This is evidence he gave during his 11 various trials, yes. 12 Q. He found this "really inspirational", were his words, 13 and he would listen to audio recordings with Tanweer of 14 war songs about Jihad? 15 A. That is correct. 16 Q. He said that his opinions developed so that he put 17 posters on his bedroom wall of the Mujahaddin and 18 Kalashnikovs? 19 A. Yes, that is also correct. 20 Q. And he asked if he could accompany MSK to the training 21 camp in 2001, and he did? 22 A. Yes, that's correct. 23 Q. In relation to that camp, I think, looking at page 2 of 24 the digest of the evidence, in summary, did they fly 25 together to Islamabad where they were picked up by
1 a vehicle openly marked with Harkat Ul Mujahaddin 2 stickers? 3 A. That's correct, yes. 4 Q. And did he indicate that, at that time, people weren't 5 shy about this in Pakistan and that everybody in 6 Pakistan knew what the HUM were all about? 7 A. That's correct. This was before the events of 8 11 September 2001. 9 Q. Yes. So they drove in this way to the HUM office in 10 Islamabad and then they made their way to a mountaintop 11 in Kashmir where there were some 100 to 200, as he put 12 it, brothers receiving physical training, firing 13 Kalashnikovs, learning how to strip and clean them? 14 A. That's correct. 15 Q. And that, after attendance at the camp, 16 Mohammed Sidique Khan and Ali, together, travelled 17 across the border into Afghanistan. Again, they openly 18 went to a large HUM building in Kabul, where they, as he 19 put it, signed up before going to the front line near 20 the Bagram airfield? 21 A. That is correct, yes. 22 Q. And they spent some time there with MSK, on occasions 23 going up to the front line? 24 A. That is also correct, yes. 25 Q. Then finally in relation to that travel, did he say that
1 it was later believed that Omar Khyam had also been out 2 there at around about the same time, because evidence 3 from Khyam's passport suggested that he had been in 4 Pakistan between June and August of 2001? 5 A. That's certainly correct, yes. 6 Q. He said that, at that time -- and as you've mentioned, 7 before 9/11, things were different, but at that time 8 recruitment for training camps and fund-raising was 9 openly going on in the United Kingdom in mosques, and at 10 other organisations? 11 A. That is as Waheed Ali said, yes. 12 Q. But that he said that, although things went underground 13 after 9/11, even thereafter, as he put it, they weren't 14 secretive in Pakistan, so that there was still a degree 15 of openness about this kind of training? 16 A. That's correct, yes. 17 Q. Then next, in relation to 2003 and the trip to the 18 Malakand training camp, again, this was confirmed in the 19 evidence of Mohammed Shakil during his two trials, and 20 I think there's a digest of his evidence at page 7 that 21 you've considered. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. In relation to that, perhaps taking it quickly, did he 24 indicate that he believed that MSK was collecting money 25 from those who were sympathetic to the Afghanistan
1 Taliban? 2 A. He does, yes. 3 Q. And that he brought it out with him when they went to 4 Islamabad in the summer of 2003? 5 A. That's correct, yes. 6 Q. And that, at the training camp there, which, as we know, 7 was attended by the witness Babar, there was again 8 physical training, shooting exercises, lectures about 9 Jihad? 10 A. That's correct, yes. 11 Q. Did he, in his evidence, say that, at that camp, 12 Mohammed Sidique Khan had been getting, as he put it, 13 very close to Omar Khyam and to the witness Babar? 14 A. He did, yes. 15 Q. And that, after MSK returned to England in the autumn of 16 2003, he would travel south in England to meet up with 17 some of those who had been at the camp with him and that 18 Tanweer had also been present on at least one of those 19 visits down south? 20 A. That's correct, yes. 21 Q. As you said yourself, Mr McKenna, in your report, Babar 22 gave evidence to similar effect, didn't he, in a number 23 of trials -- the Crevice trial and the two Theseus 24 trials? 25 A. That's correct, he's also given evidence in Canada.
1 Q. In a digest in relation to his evidence at page 11 -- 2 again, perhaps, if we could quickly just highlight one 3 or two parts of what he revealed about this training 4 camp -- did he indicate that, while MSK was present at 5 that camp in Malakand, there had been a test explosion 6 that had been carried out by Khyam and Babar some 7 distance away from where the men were training but that 8 would nevertheless have been within earshot? 9 A. That's correct, yes. 10 Q. In relation to Khyam, and in relation to the sorts of 11 views that he had, did he indicate in general terms that 12 Khyam was openly expressing to him Khyam's mindset and 13 thoughts about Jihad and suicide bombings and the like? 14 A. That is correct, yes. 15 Q. So although there was no direct evidence of MSK stating 16 what was going through his mind, certainly the evidence 17 was that he was associating very closely with somebody 18 who himself had those sorts of opinions? 19 A. That's correct, yes. 20 Q. Did he say that, at that camp at Malakand, there was 21 a video recording made in which MSK featured with his 22 face covered, the purpose of which was to play it back 23 in the United Kingdom in order to raise money for Jihad? 24 A. That is correct, that's in his testimony, yes. 25 Q. Then finally, Mr McKenna, in relation to 2004, was there
1 evidence given, again from Witness B, in a statement 2 obtained from the police that tended to support the 3 suggestion that MSK, on that occasion, had been engaged 4 in some kind of terrorist purposes? 5 A. What, during the course of his visit in late 2004? 6 Q. In late 2004? 7 A. That's correct, my Lady. 8 Q. Then finally, again, Waheed Ali gave evidence on two 9 occasions in his trials, didn't he, that when he was -- 10 when he travelled out there and himself went to 11 a training camp, that he was -- that he saw Tanweer and 12 Mohammed Sidique Khan and that Tanweer said, "We've 13 already done what you've done. You can catch up with us 14 in a bit"? 15 A. That's correct, yes. 16 Q. In other words, stating that they had, on that occasion, 17 undergone training, but were going off somewhere for 18 some other purpose? 19 A. That's right. I think the suggestion being that Khan 20 and Tanweer had been in Pakistan for some time before 21 Shakil arrived, and suggested that they were going off 22 to do something for the brothers and they could catch up 23 in a few weeks. 24 Q. Saleem gave evidence to similar effect, did he not, and 25 indeed said that, in the spring of 2005, back in
1 England, MSK said to him "It's a bit hot, you guys keep 2 a distance for a little while" -- 3 A. That's correct. 4 Q. -- and that would therefore have been at around about 5 the time MSK was deeply involved in the planning for 6 the July 2005 attack? 7 A. Yes. 8 MR PATTERSON: Thank you very much, Mr McKenna, I've no more 9 questions. 10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hall? 11 Questions by MR HALL 12 MR HALL: Mr McKenna, can I ask you about page 20 [INQ11410-20], please, 13 of your report, and I wonder if we could just have that 14 briefly on screen? 15 A. Page 20? 16 Q. Yes, 20. You've already said that there is no evidence 17 that you found that the 7/7 plot was conceived 18 before November 2004, yes? 19 A. That's correct, yes. 20 Q. In fact, can you confirm -- and as you say in the second 21 sentence of paragraph 6.1 -- there is, in fact, strong 22 positive evidence that the plot was not formed until 23 after MSK's departure to Pakistan on 18 November 2004? 24 A. That is correct. 25 Q. Thank you, and that's the evidence that Mr Keith
1 referred you to this morning and which you set out in 2 the remainder of paragraph 6? 3 A. That's correct, my Lady. 4 MR HALL: Thank you. 5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hill? 6 Questions by MR HILL 7 MR HILL: Only briefly, five short topics, please, 8 Mr McKenna. Firstly, in relation to questions asked 9 during the course of the day about the initiative which 10 is now known as the "Know Your Customer" campaign. 11 I think you're privy to documents generated by the 12 National Counter-Terrorism Security Office and they 13 include briefing notes on hydrogen peroxide initiatives, 14 and you may even have copies there with you, which 15 I mention just to elicit the fact that -- and this is to 16 pick up one of my Lady's questions this afternoon about 17 the known use of hydrogen peroxide in the industrial 18 market as well as the domestic market -- is it a fact 19 that the "Know Your Customer" campaign, first introduced 20 in 2005, was, as you've said, designed to raise 21 awareness in industry about the dual use of certain 22 chemicals? 23 As that campaign rolled out, was there promotion 24 through, for example, industry trade associations such 25 as the CIA, the Chemical Industries Association, and the
1 CBA, the Chemical Businesses Association, as opposed to 2 letters used in other contexts elsewhere and, indeed, 3 trade journals and other industrial small or large scale 4 outlets, including dispensing chemists, pharmacies, 5 opticians, dentists and the like, and that was part of 6 a large campaign domestically and, as you told us 7 earlier, in conjunction with foreign liaison efforts 8 through other EU countries and, indeed, other parts of 9 the world? 10 A. That's correct, I think the whole purpose was to cast 11 the net as wide as is possible. 12 Q. So the initiative which may yet lead to EU regulations 13 is designed to encompass uses of high quantity and, in 14 particular, high concentration hydrogen peroxide to 15 ensure that, where there are instances of high level 16 purchase in high concentrations, that is either outlawed 17 by regulation or is so visible through the "Know Your 18 Customer" campaign that it will, one hopes, be brought 19 to the attention of the authorities. 20 A. That's correct, my Lady. 21 Q. But that leaves either low volume or low concentration 22 purchase, which, as we know, sadly, from the events of 23 7 July, can still be a precursor to an explosive event, 24 particularly if individuals buying in smaller quantities 25 and at low concentration have the wherewithal to so
1 manipulate the materials so as to form part of explosive 2 devices? 3 A. That's correct. 4 Q. That's all I want to ask about that. 5 Second topic. I don't want to spend time on it. 6 My Lady will draw her own conclusions from all of the 7 evidence, but the enquiry report published by the 8 Charities Commission on 22 February, of which I think 9 you have a copy, is, so far as we are aware, publicly 10 available, because it's on the Charities Commission 11 website, and so, just for completeness -- and I'm going 12 to page 10 at paragraph 58, the conclusions of the 13 Charities Commission report -- after their own lengthy 14 examination, were the conclusions as follows: 15 That the Commission concluded: did carry out 16 activities compatible with advancing its object to 17 advance the Islamic faith? 18 A. That's correct. 19 Q. That there was no evidence that charity funds were used 20 to fund the 7/7 terrorist attacks? 21 A. That also is correct. 22 Q. And that the majority of the material from the bookshop 23 area of the charity's premises that was removed by the 24 police and viewed by the enquiry -- that's the 25 Charities Commission enquiry -- was capable of advancing
1 the Islamic faith? However, approximately a fifth of 2 the material reviewed was considered to be political, 3 biased propagandist or otherwise inappropriate for 4 a charity advancing the Islamic faith? 5 A. That's correct, my Lady. 6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: And that's what was left? 7 MR HILL: That's what was left. That does not place that 8 one fifth of the material left in the category of 9 material that would be susceptible to prosecution as 10 representing criminal offences, but nonetheless, there 11 was an incompatibility with the majority of the material 12 left which the Commission concluded was for the purpose, 13 it seemed, of advancing the general object of the 14 charity, advancement of the Islamic faith? 15 A. That's correct, my Lady. 16 Q. That's all I want to ask about that. Three further 17 matters. 18 You were asked -- this is in relation to the most 19 recent short report that you prepared for my Lady, and 20 under the topic "Port and border controls", it's 21 paragraph 2.1 within this short addendum report, under 22 the heading "Measures now in place to prevent persons 23 travelling abroad for the purpose of attending training 24 camps". The statutory regime in force in 2005, by 25 virtue of the Terrorism Act 2000, includes under
1 schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act provisions enabling 2 a range of individuals described accurately by Mr Keith, 3 constables, immigration officers or designated customs 4 officers to question -- and the range of the power is 5 broad, isn't it -- to question any person who is at 6 a port for the purposes of entering or leaving the 7 country? 8 A. That is correct. The threshold for intervention is 9 extremely low. 10 Q. For the sake of clarity, it is not the fact that the 11 examining officer, in order to perform a stop under this 12 schedule 7 power must have a formed suspicion that the 13 person is concerned in the commission, preparation or 14 instigation of acts of terrorism? 15 A. That is correct. 16 Q. The fourth matter, in relation to page 28 [INQ11410-28] of your longer 17 report, paragraph 7.15, Mr Patterson's questions about 18 CCTV from Luton railway station. 19 You've told us about the fruits of that enquiry into 20 CCTV footage. It being the case, of course, that there 21 was no CCTV footage inside the carriage, inside the 22 train itself, which travelled from Luton to King's Cross 23 that morning. 24 A. No, there was not. 25 Q. You do establish, or your team were able to establish,
1 that the four bombers caught the 07.23 London-bound 2 train. It appears that they entered the train in pairs. 3 But was it clear, is it clear, perhaps contrary to 4 Mr Patterson's question or an inference from his 5 question, that they necessarily entered different 6 carriages or may it be the case that they entered the 7 same carriage, albeit through separate doors, in pairs? 8 A. Entirely possible. They vanish from view as they walk 9 along the platform at Luton railway station. It's 10 impossible to determine precisely how they got on to the 11 train and which doors they took. 12 Equally, at King's Cross, it is not possible to see 13 them all alighting the carriage once it's arrived at 14 King's Cross Thameslink, only as they walk together as 15 a larger group along the platform and down in towards 16 the Underground. 17 Q. But you would say, therefore, that with regard, for 18 example, to Mr Sylvester's observations, it should be 19 borne in mind that the CCTV examination, exhaustive 20 though it was, was not able to conclude that the bombers 21 were in separate carriages necessarily? 22 A. No, it was not. 23 Q. The final topic is this: questions asked from the 24 transcripts of the evidence given in another court in 25 the context of the Operation Theseus 7/7 conspiracy
1 trials. 2 It is a fact, is this right, that the matters put 3 from those trial transcripts by Mr Patterson, entirely 4 accurate though he was as to transcription, these were 5 all accounts that were provided in 2008 or 2009 -- 6 and/or, I should say, 2009 -- during the two public 7 trials? 8 A. That's correct, my Lady. 9 Q. In relation to Waheed Ali, also known as Shipon Ullah, 10 and Mohammed Shakil, they were, to take it shortly, 11 partially acquitted but partially convicted at the end 12 of that process? 13 A. That's correct, my Lady. 14 Q. In the case of both of those men, the convictions 15 recorded against them at their second trial were upon 16 the basis that a jury was satisfied that they, in 2007, 17 were in the course of a conspiracy to travel for the 18 purpose of terrorist training, to attend training camps? 19 A. That's correct. They were being prosecuted under the 20 relatively recent legislation at that time that 21 encompassed attending training camps. 22 Q. It follows, does it, that when we look at accounts of 23 previous trips abroad, which you were taken through 24 briefly, it is the fact that, so far as Ali and Shakil 25 is concerned, the accounts they were giving were their
1 own personal account in the course of a wider defence 2 which they maintained to all of the charges laid against 3 them. 4 A. That is correct, my Lady. 5 Q. It may or may not be appropriate, but I ask you as 6 a seasoned criminal investigator. The observation that 7 comes to mind is that there was an element of confess 8 and avoid to the accounts given by both of these men? 9 A. I think that's a fair conclusion -- 10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think I can take judicial notice of 11 that, Mr Hill. 12 MR HILL: Other very experienced criminal practitioners or 13 former criminal practitioners in court. 14 For the avoidance of doubt, and finally, that 15 context -- namely, the giving of evidence at a time when 16 the person giving evidence and giving evidence of events 17 which may or may not be capable of independent 18 verification -- that would also apply to 19 Mohammed Junaid Babar? 20 A. That is also correct. 21 MR HILL: Thank you. 22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr McKenna, it looks as if those are 23 all the questions that we have for you. Back at the 24 beginning of 2010, I was promised by the Commissioner of 25 the Metropolitan Police and by Mr Yates of
1 New Scotland Yard that I would receive the fullest 2 cooperation from the service and that's exactly what has 3 happened. 4 I am extremely grateful to you, in particular, and 5 obviously also to all your team -- I'm afraid I didn't 6 get a note of all their names -- for the huge amount of 7 work that you put in in preparing the material for me 8 and, if I may say so, I should like to commend you all 9 on your skill and dedication, and also many 10 congratulations on what must be a unique investigation 11 as far as Operation Theseus was concerned. 12 A. Thank you, my Lady. 13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Let's hope it is unique. 14 A. Yes. 15 MR KEITH: Thank you, Officer. 16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr McKenna. 17 MR KEITH: My Lady, Detective Chief Superintendent McKenna 18 concludes the evidence in these proceedings. 19 My Lady, without detracting from the gravity and 20 purpose of these proceedings and the terrible loss 21 suffered, of course, by the bereaved families, may I say 22 one thing more? 23 I hope my Lady won't think it impertinent, if, as 24 your counsel, I thank you, but on behalf of the Bar, it 25 would remiss of me not to express our general gratitude,
1 and may I also mention again, without in any way 2 detracting from the purpose of these proceedings, four 3 other persons whose names I've not made reference to 4 today, but they are, of course, your solicitors, 5 Martin Smith and Tim Suter, and your other counsel, 6 Andrew O'Connor and Benjamin Hay. 7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Keith. 8 I should like to congratulate and thank everyone, 9 not only all the lawyers and obviously my Inquest team, 10 but all those who have supported them in whatever 11 capacity for completing the evidence by today according 12 to the timetable. 13 I confess there were times when I didn't believe it 14 possible, but it has happened, and it's thanks to the 15 endeavours of all of you and all of those who have 16 supported you. 17 I consider it a very major achievement to get 18 through such a huge quantity of material and 19 particularly given the harrowing nature of it. 20 I know that a number of bereaved families have 21 stayed with us for the bulk of the proceedings. I hope 22 that they and those who have followed at a distance, and 23 the survivors, will feel that we have conducted 24 a thorough and robust investigation, whatever my 25 conclusions may eventually be and, whether or not they
1 eventually agree with them, I hope they'll agree that we 2 have left no reasonable stone unturned. 3 I would like to thank them for acting throughout, in 4 the most appallingly distressing circumstances at times, 5 with the dignity and restraint that they have shown. 6 Thank you all. 7 (3.20 pm) 8 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am on Thursday, 9 10 March 2011) 10 11
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