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4-6. The explosions and the immediate aftermath - Command and Control 4. Which of the 52 deceased were killed immediately by the explosions, and which survived for a period of time thereafter.
5. In respect of each of those who were not killed immediately by the explosions, what happened to them; what attention and/or treatment they received; whether there were any failings in the way that they were treated; the circumstances of their death; whether any failings in the emergency response contributed to or were causative of their death.
6. Whether a decision ought to have been taken prior to the explosion at Tavistock Square to close some or all of the transport network. Forum Led by: J7 Admins
10-11. Pathology issues 10. The general nature of injuries typically caused by proximity to explosions.
11. Issues regarding particular injuries sustained by individual deceased. Forum Led by: J7 Admins
13-23. Preventability 13. Whether there was a failure by West Yorkshire Police properly to investigate and/or assess the fact that MSK had attended a training camp in 2001.
14. Whether there was a failure by West Yorkshire Police and/or the Security Service properly to investigate and/or assess the fact that a car registered to ‘Sidique Khan’ had given a lift to a known extremist in Leeds in April 2003.
15. Whether there were failings on the part of the Security Service and/or the West Yorkshire Police and/or the Metropolitan Police properly to investigate and/or assess the intelligence relating to MSK and Tanweer arising from the Crevice investigation, whether at the time of the events in question or following the Crevice arrests.
16. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service to show appropriate photographs of MSK and Mohammed Shakil to “the detainee” and to identify that they had been in Pakistan with the Crevice plotters in 2003.
17. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service and/or West Yorkshire Police properly to investigate and/or assess the information, received in January 2005 that men named “Saddique” and “Imran” had undergone training in Afghanistan, lived in Batley and were extremists.
18. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service and/or West Yorkshire Police properly to investigate and/or assess the further information received in March 2005, namely that “Saddique” had received military training in a mujahideen camp in Pakistan in early 2001.
19. Whether the Security Service ought to have discovered the fact that both MSK and Tanweer had attended extremist training camps in Pakistan in 2004-2005.
20. Whether, in light of the matters set out above:
a. the Security Service ought to have assessed that MSK and/or Tanweer were directly involved in or had knowledge of plans for terrorist activity or may have had knowledge of terrorist activity and should therefore have been designated as “essential targets” rather than as “desirable targets”; and/or
b. the Security Service ought to have commenced surveillance in relation to MSK and Tanweer and/or ought to have instigated other appropriate investigations.
21. Whether there were any failures of communication between the Security Service and West Yorkshire Police in relation to the gathering and assessment of relevant intelligence relating to MSK and Tanweer.
22. Whether the assessments by the Security Service in relation to MSK and Tanweer were affected by any inadequate record-keeping.
23. Whether any of the above alleged failings contributed to or were causative of the events of 7 July 2005. Forum Led by: J7 Admins