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Forum Rules July 7th Media Watch, Letters & FOI Requests

A forum documenting factually inaccurate July 7th Press and Media coverage. Here you will find copies of complaints to those responsible for propagating lies and myths that have hitherto gone unchallenged and their responses. Also included in this forum are copies of complaints to the Press Complaints Commission, along with copies of Freedom of Information requests, letters to MPs and communications with miscellaneous other public servants.

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 The Terrorist Hunter (ITV1 22nd June), & Andy Hayman's book
Muncher
Posted: Jun 17 2009, 09:33 AM





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Joined: 22-June 06



Monday, 22/06/2009, 20:00 - 20:30 (00:30)
ITV1

The Terrorist Hunter: Tonight
(news/current affairs (general))

Should there be a public inquiry into the 7/7 attacks on London? Trevor McDonald talks exclusively to former senior police officer Andy Hayman about his views on the subject.
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cmain
Posted: Jun 17 2009, 11:29 AM





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Joined: 19-January 06



news/current affairs?

More like Andy Hayman promotes his about to be published book (2nd July) with a one letter difference in the title (The Terrorist Hunters).
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amirrortotheenemy
Posted: Jun 17 2009, 08:00 PM





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Joined: 6-November 06



Both Andy Hayman & Margaret Gilmore, who is married to Eamonn Matthews, are represented by Knight Ayton Management

QUOTE
Andy Hayman and Margaret Gilmore's book, The Terrorist Hunters will be published by Bantam Press on 25th June 2009.

Based at New Scotland Yard and in charge of thousands of Special Branch and counter-terrorism officers in the UK and across the globe, Andy Hayman was in overall command of the UK's national counter-terrorism offensive and at the centre of every major terrorist investigation.

In an inspirational and at times heart-breaking account, Andy describes how he led a dedicated team of men and women, committed to protecting the UK from dangerous enemies. Hayman is able to give unprecedented insight into key top-level crisis meetings he attended with intelligence chiefs and political leaders worldwide and he leaves no holds barred in his analysis of the way law enforcers tackle terrorism.

Knight Ayton Management


QUOTE
Margaret Gilmore is a writer, broadcaster and analyst specialising in homeland security, the media, and the environment. She's currently writing a book with Andy Hayman, formerly the senior police officer in charge of UK counter-terrorism. "The Terrorist Hunters" will be the first definitive account of the terrorist threat to the UK in the past five years and will be published on July 2nd 2009 by Bantam Press.

She is also a Senior Research Fellow with the leading security think tank RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), the 2008 think-tank of the year, where she specialises in homeland security, terrorism and the Olympics.

Margaret has been an authoritative face on our TV screens for 19 years, respected for her writing and broadcasting, her specialist knowledge and analytical skills, her wide range of contacts and her appeal to the audience. She continues to appear on our screens as an expert and to write speeches, articles and in-depth reports, make films and videos, and chair conferences. During a distinguished career in television, radio and newspapers she spent seven years as senior Home Affairs Correspondent for BBC News. Before that she was Environment and Agriculture Correspondent. She's also worked on "Newsnight" and "Panorama" and has won a number of major awards. She’s now a Non-Executive Director sitting on the Boards of the Food Standards Agency and the Meat Hygiene Service. You can read more about Margaret in Who's Who and Facebook. 

Margaret also chairs conferences and seminars and is a highly skilled conference facilitator and after dinner speaker. She has a wealth of experience hosting events and award ceremonies, both at home and abroad.

Margaret's website is: www.margaretgilmore.com

Source


QUOTE
Andy Hayman
andy_hayman_web2009.jpg

Until early 2008 Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman was the most senior policeman in charge of the UK’s counter terrorism policy and operations. He worked directly to the Cabinet and Prime Minister. Whilst in post he controlled the police operations that foiled 15 terrorist attacks and led to the conviction of 50 perpetrators. Previously in his police career he’d been a Chief Constable and in charge of the Met’s anti-drugs and anti-corruption teams. In his years as a police officer he’d seen service in some of the most contentious and difficult areas of policing. Freed from the constraints of his uniform Andy is now establishing a portfolio of interests. He is exclusively commentating for ITV News and NBC on security and policing issues. His unique perspective on contemporary issues provides an interesting insight for the viewer. Complementary to the television work is a regular commentary slot writing exclusively for The Times newspaper. This offers a further opportunity to inform contemporary debates. A further opportunity has also been finalised in a deal to publish a book. Simon Thorogood, Senior Editor at Transworld, has acquired The Terrorist Hunters by Andy Hayman with Margaret Gilmore, which will be the first definitive inside account of Britain’s handling of the terrorist threat over the past five years. The book will be an insider’s account of how the police and MI5 are tackling one of the biggest issues facing our society - from the events of July 7 2005 to how the threat needs to be handled in the future. Hayman is writing the book with eminent journalist Margaret Gilmore, who was the BBC’s Senior Home Affairs Correspondent. The Terrorist Hunters will be published by Bantam Press in July 2009.

Source


And so is Samira Ahmed

QUOTE
Samira Ahmed

Samira Ahmed picture Samira Ahmed is a familiar face to viewers as an experienced presenter and correspondent for Channel 4 News. Previously a news correspondent and presenter for BBC News, BBC World and Newsnight, and a presenter at Deutsche Welle TV in Berlin, Samira has reported extensively on crime, terrorism and the arts and was BBC Los Angeles correspondent. From covering the trial of OJ Simpson to the rise of Islamic radicalism in Britain, or interviewing World War One veterans, her reporting draws on a passion for exploring the human motivations and stories behind the headlines.

For her Channel 4 documentary series, Islam Unveiled she travelled across the world to explore the status of Muslim women. Her arts coverage has focussed on her extensive knowledge of cinema, but ranges to the quirky: Samira's made features on the "real" Godzilla, 60’s graphic designers Robert Brownjohn and Alan Fletcher, and British design icons -- the hovercraft and Concorde.

Samira has lectured on crime reporting, terrorism, Islamic radicalism and feminism at the London School of Economics, Sheffield Hallam University and the Berlin Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. She read English at St Edmund Hall, Oxford, and has chaired discussions for the Royal Shakespeare Company. She has also chaired conferences for the Home Office, the Department for International Development, and Transport for London and presented the first ever Civil Service awards. She speaks fluent Hindi/Urdu and German.

Samira also chairs conferences and seminars and is a highly skilled conference facilitator and after dinner speaker. She has a wealth of experience hosting events and award ceremonies, both at home and abroad.

Source


THE CASE FOR CHANGING THE LAWS ON REPORTING TERRORISM by Margaret Gilmore

QUOTE
If anyone in the police or MI5 seriously believed that when the Crevice trial ended the press would concentrate on their success in foiling the plot, they were naïve.  For nearly two years journalists had known the Crevice plotters met two of the July 7 bombers, and that the bombers had been filmed, photographed, followed and recorded by undercover officers from MI5.  Yet the men were never treated as a priority  and more than a year later went on to detonate the London bombs, killing 52 people, and injuring a further 700. 

Contempt laws meant the British public and more crucially the families of victims of 7/7 were not allowed to know what journalists, lawyers and the security services knew.  Having sat on the story for so long the press wasn’t simply going to write and broadcast about the thwarted Crevice plot: they would inevitably focus on how MI5 failed to stop one of Britain’s worst terrorist outrages even though its ringleader had been under surveillance.

The debate about whether the press was right to focus on failure rather than success masks another important issue for both the security services and journalists.  The press coverage of Crevice was about the Al Qaeda of four years ago.  The coverage of  MI5’s failure to stop the July 7 attacks is rooted in the activities of the Al Qaeda of two years ago (and for that matter the MI5 of two years ago).  Little can be told to the British public about the threat from al Qaeda now, in 2007, because the media are in effect prevented from doing so. 

Journalists would like people to know about cases waiting to go through the courts because these cases would shed light on the current threat.  In a rare example of common cause the security services would also like this to be the case. However as the law stands it’s impossible for journalists to write about these cases without being seen to prejudice the trials.  The effect of the contempt laws is to prevent the public getting up to date information which would help them assess how great the threat of terrorism is, and how far they should allow politicians to pass new laws and curb civil liberties to tackle it.

In a major speech in April Peter Clarke, head of the police Counter-Terrorism Command, hinted at his frustration. He suggested modern juries could be mature enough to work out for themselves what’s prejudicial and what’s not.  “I understand the difficulties in this” he said, “but I just wonder if we could be bolder and, dare I say it, trust juries to distinguish the prejudicial from the probative”.

A senior security source close to the investigation recently told me, “We’re not interested in what the media think about us. It’s whether or not the public understand.”  Unless the public believes in the seriousness of the threat, he explained, those tackling terrorism fear information won’t be passed to them and they won’t be able to recruit the people they need and get the information they need from the wider community.

If it had not been for the contempt laws the fact MI5 had come across the 7/7 bombers would have become public much earlier. It would not have overshadowed the Crevice trial; the success of the police and MI5 in stopping that plot would have dominated coverage at the end of the trial. More importantly the public would not once again be questioning how much they can trust the security services – for have no doubt the delayed revelations about the 7/7 bombers have shaken public confidence as to how much they’re told is true.

On the morning of July 7, 2005 when I witnessed the horrific events unfolding outside Edgware Road tube station, my first impression was of how well organised the response was. But now time has passed, one aspect in what followed seems perhaps too well organised. Within days of the attacks ministers were saying the bombers were “clean skins” – people unknown to the security services. In retrospect many people will wonder why they were so quick to say this, and what evidence they had to hand.

For nearly two years these ministerial pronouncements were to the forefront of most people’s understanding of 7/7.  Many people continued to believe the initial statements that the bombers were ‘clean skins’.  When it came, the revelation that this wasn’t the case was to many deeply shocking, and corrosive to trust.

“Why didn’t MI5 stop July 7th?” asked the front page of the Daily Mail when the story finally broke. “British Bombers and the Lost Links to 7/7” announced the Times. For three days MI5 found itself under the most intense public scrutiny.   

The Security Service went to unprecedented lengths to give its views on its website, but some of the key information was ambiguous.  In turn this led to more confusion, and risked further erosion of public confidence.

This is what I’ve since established as fact. In 2004, MI5 officers were carrying out a covert surveillance operation – codenamed Operation Crevice - on suspects planning fertiliser bomb attacks. During that surveillance they photographed the 7/7 cell leader Mohammad Sidique Khan and his accomplice Shehzad Tanweer several times with members of the Crevice cell, but did not identify them. They also recorded Khan’s voice discussing plans to go to Pakistan for terrorist training. And they identified someone named Sidique Khan as the owner of a vehicle they had been watching. They had these three separate pieces of information but they never linked them all with one and the same person.

Neither Khan nor Tanweer appeared involved in the Crevice plot which anti-terrorist officers feared was drawing close to fruition, so they were not regarded as a priority. They were put on a list of people to be followed up at a later date. However it takes up to 60 people to carry out 24 hour surveillance on one suspect. MI5 focussed their resources on other priorities – until it was too late.

Of course with hindsight it was a tragic miss. But a security source close to the investigation insisted to me, “It’s a red herring. It does not matter if Mohammad Sidique Khan was identified in our terms, because he wasn’t assessed to be a terrorist, he didn’t pose an immediate risk to public safety. With hindsight it was the wrong decision. But it wasn’t the wrong decision at the time. Given the same resources, the same intelligence and the same competing priorities, we’d make the same decision today”.

Very soon after 7/7 the security services realised the bombers were not ‘clean skins’, and that they’d had them on their radar.  Journalists picked up whispers. Just two days after the attacks, on July 9 2005, the Attorney General, citing the contempt laws, warned editors against speculation linking the bombers to terrorist suspects already under arrest.

On January 13 2006, the Judge in the Crevice case issued a court order banning mention of any link between the 7/7 bombers and the Crevice suspects who were by then finally about to be tried.  He was correct to do so - under British law the jurors were not allowed to hear anything which could prejudice their view or undermine the rights of the suspects before them, to a fair, unbiased trial. 

The result of all this was the British public was kept in the dark about the truth for almost two years - which brings us full circle back to the contempt laws.

If public trust in what the security services say about the Al Qaeda threat is to be re-established either the speed at which trials are heard needs to be vastly increased (unlikely) or Britain has to change its contempt laws. At the moment the press struggles  to write about how the reorganised Al Qaeda of 2007 operates in the UK, because the cases which would illustrate this won’t emerge into court for another two years.

We all understand why we have contempt laws. Yet juries aren’t stupid. If we can trust them to find someone guilty of a charge that will condemn them to life in prison should we not, as Peter Clarke suggests, also trust them to follow evidence they hear in court, rather than press accounts?  After all, many countries – including the US – have very different laws in this area.

Even Shami Chakrabati, Director of the human rights group Liberty, thinks there is room for investigating a cautious loosening of the laws, although she warns, “There’s a balance to be struck between keeping people in the loop in order to retain public confidence, and ensuring cases aren’t tried in the media on rumour and gossip rather than on evidence in court”. 

MI5’s failure to stop the 7/7 plot will always be remembered. But the awkward truth is that if they’d diverted people to monitor Mohammad Sidique Khan back in 2004, we might be bewailing the fact they didn’t stop other attacks. Take the alleged plot to bomb trans-Atlantic aircraft  - if that had succeeded intelligence officers claim thousands of people could have been killed.  “Instead”, my security source explains, “thousands of lives have been saved by our work, and that’s truly amazing”.

In 2004 MI5 had a staff of 2,000. By next year they’ll have 3,500, with eight new regional stations outside of London. However the UK  Then MI5 were following some 50 networks. Now they say they’re tracking 200. In July 2005 they were aware of 800 people they wanted to track – that number is now 1,600.  appears no safer now than in 2004.

Peter Clarke has warned, ‘I think it is no exaggeration to say that the lack of public trust in intelligence is in danger of infecting the relationship between the police and the communities we serve….We must maintain that trust’.

He faces a tough struggle.  As the delay in revealing the truth about the 7/7 bombers illustrates,  we have the British Public kept in the dark but being told the threat is as bad as ever. We have enraged victims who believe they’ve been short changed because they discover vital facts have been kept from them. And we have the police and MI5 frustrated that when rumour and speculation does get out, they can’t answer back or comment.

Source
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Bridget
Posted: Jun 17 2009, 09:02 PM





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Synchronistically, as I was reading this, Occupation on BBC1 was showing clips of July 7th and a Margaret Gilmore report.
QUOTE
RUSI Speech

MARGARET GILMORE: KEYNOTE  SPEECH TO “RUSI 3RD ANNUAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND RESILIENCE CONFERENCE” 2007


“THREAT PERCEPTIONS Vs TECHNOLOGY REALITIES”

An examination of the proportionality of security technologies being introduced in relation to the actual threats that are faced from terrorism in the UK: and the impacts of these technologies upon society and the role of the media in covering these areas of public concern.

Margaret Gilmore, Journalist, Broadcaster and Analyst, Associate Fellow RUSI.

For seven years, even since 9/11, politicians have been introducing new technologies at huge expense to the taxpayer. Throughout that time, as a journalist specialising in Home Affairs, I have been examining whether those technologies are actually needed to fight terrorism. Are they proportionate to the threat – and if so why are some people so sceptical about them? RUSI has asked me to look at this today, and to study the gap between the perceived threat and the reality.

There is no doubt there is a gap between what’s being introduced and what many believe is actually necessary. Identity cards are an obvious example – massively expensive, yet we all know and the politicians admit – they would not have stopped the July the 7th attacks. 

What about the new computer systems at airports in the USA? Colleagues tell me if you’re doing a trip across the states say from New York, to Miami, to LA to Washington and back to New York, each leg registers as a one way, rather than a return journey, and because it appears you’re on a single trip, you’re flagged up as a suspect. Four little crosses appear on your boarding card. Now it wouldn’t take long for a terrorist carrying out a reconnoitre to work this out, and while they’ll be booking return tickets instead, precious resources are wasted giving television crews the once over. It may be in the past few months this has been dealt with – many of you here today will know better than me – but the question remains, is the money being spent on technologies that will actually prevent terrorism? And are the technologies being suggested now, fighting the Al Qaeda of five years ago instead of the Al Qaeda the security forces are currently combating?

THREAT PERCEPTION SET BY 7/7

Let’s start by looking at the threat. The one key event which has set our perception of the terrorist threat is of course 7/7.

That was the day that showed the threat was real. I witnessed the effects first hand, as some of you did. I remember how the first phone call I received that morning came within ten minutes of the first three explosions. Initially we were told it was a series of power failures – a big enough story on its own given it was the day after London had been awarded the 2012 Olympics.

But as I drove down the M4, and saw the London Closed sign above the motorway  and heard there’d been a fourth explosion on a bus, it became  crystal clear these were terrorist attacks.

I had prepared for this, for years. I had been briefed by the intelligence agencies, the police and government. There’d even been a full drill one Sunday in the City of London when all the emergency services, in fact everyone involved including the media, had rehearsed the very scenario of a bomb on the underground.

Back to July 7th. I drove in as queues of traffic left London. I saw how quickly, much of the city became like a ghost town, with small groups of people huddled round TV shops watching the story unfold.

I went first to Edgware Road, and there were the emergency services, fire brigade police ambulance, moving fast but relatively calmly, people who didn't need treatment dazed, describing in graphic detail what they’d seen below. That was disturbing enough, although in retrospect I realize we had little idea at that point, of the horror of what was still happening as the rescue operation continued underground.

OUTLINE OF MY ARGUMENT

It’s not surprising 7/7 has set out our perception of the threat – it’s the only recent incident that’s happened on UK soil. But there is a huge backlog of other alleged failed plots which can’t be reported because our contempt laws won’t allow it. This afternoon I will argue that as a result of this, our perceptions of the terrorists, of how Al Qaeda organizes itself, and its aims and objectives are to a great extent, frozen in time. This makes it very difficult for the public to match the threat as they perceive it, with new laws and technologies that are being proposed now. It makes it extremely difficult for people to judge whether the response is proportionate. We have to rely on what politicians tell us, and there is a wide belief that they spin terror – in the interests of getting the right headlines.     

I plan to argue that only with greater transparency can the true nature of the threat be understood by the voting public – and that means changes in the contempt laws as called for recently by senior police officers and lawyers. Only when that happens will the public really accept the need for new technologies and laws. Only when that happens will the people be able to properly evaluate how appropriate new technologies are for fighting terrorism. On identity cards for example, as I said they wouldn’t have stopped 7/7 but would they have stopped other incidents? Right now the public can’t know.

HOW MODERN TECHNOLOGY IS EXPLOITED BY TERRORISTS, AND HAS CHANGED THE WAY TERRORISM IS REPORTED

These are things we have to address because while we as a society have this tension, the terrorists are exploiting modern technology. But before I move onto the technologies used by the authorities to fight terrorism, let me talk a little about what the terrorists use. Their oxygen is communication via the internet. They rely on our broadcasting technologies – they want “spectaculars”, knowing the media will cover them.  The truth is if the media didn’t cover them, the public would be profoundly uneasy and policing terrorism would be even more difficult. And that’s because ever-more sophisticated mobile phones, and websites like You Tube, mean terrorist attacks would get reported anyway but in a less reliable way. 

If there is one outstanding thing about the way 7/7 was reported, it was the way advanced technologies meant public participation in the coverage was overwhelming.

Within minutes of the first bombs people were emailing the BBC with mobile phone pictures of the attacks. There could not be any cover-up of what happened, any delay in confronting the situation by police or ministers while they worked on a panic limitation policy - because the public wouldn’t allow it. The police and the government could not pretend these were anything other than bomb attacks because the public had filmed and broadcast the blasts, published their pictures on the internet and sent them to us. It was the first major domestic story where the public drove the coverage. The police and the government had no choice but to speak out, openly and fast. Don’t  forget we the press, the TV crews were not allowed underground for days so the only pictures we had of that came from the public.  I should tell you the TV channels were very quick to exploit this, appealing for pictures on the day – whereas the police took several days before they started appealing for material, which of course they needed as evidence.

Within hours of the attacks we were being emailed photographs and details of missing people - we didn't have to go looking for phone numbers - they were coming to us

There were rumours the police had shut down the mobile phone system but the police in fact decided not to in case it caused panic. I know they didn’t because every now and again I did get a call – mostly from bosses giving competing instructions, so I was quite happy that most of their calls did not get through. 

And I have to admit I did have the added help of being able to communicate with the cameraman I was meeting at Edgware Road because the BBC had been given a small number of emergency phones which over-ride the normal system. These are phones given to key people in government and the emergency services but also a small number to the BBC to carry out its public service remit giving out critical information.

So is the threat real? Yes. 7/7 proved it. 

Has modern technology changed the way we report it, and the way the terrorists seek to exploit the media? Yes.

HOW TECHNOLOGIES INTRODUCED TO PREVENT TERRORISM AFFECT SOCIETY

So why is the public’s perception of the threat different from the current reality?

And why are so many people sceptical about the technologies used to prevent terrorism, to track suspects before the event. Can these new technologies be justified by events like 7/7, and what impact are they having on our society? Are they really helping the fight against terrorism or are they simply making it easier for the state and for private industry to spy on us?   

I believe many people are already worried about how far commercial companies use modern technologies to glean information about our behaviour, about what we eat and buy and do, and even to predict our future behaviour.

There’s concern that technology introduced for one thing is sometimes then put to a completely different use

    * Oyster cards which pay for travel on the London underground are now increasingly used to help police inquires for example.
    * The system used for congestion charging in London is now also used to look for stolen cars and for terrorist suspects.
    * The police number plate recognition system currently used to check anyone’s car for traffic and other offences was originally used to look for IRA bombers.

Now people see that in the name of fighting terrorism, law enforcement agencies are using machines which for example, screen us down to our bare flesh, others which can follow our every financial move, or intercept every word we speak or write on a computer. We are filmed and followed, and monitored as never before. There are vast databases some used by law enforcement agencies, some by private companies and some by both.

And some people are worried that however sophisticated these technologies are, they are not infallible. That creates distrust of them. What happens when they go wrong? It’s bad enough when it’s commercial – we suddenly become a credit risk and can’t get a bank account or use our credit card. But many government run technologies and databases have a poor reputation, which only serves to compound the public’s lack of confidence in the government’s new technologies. 

People have been refused jobs because they’ve wrongly been branded criminals after checks by the CRB, the Criminal Records Bureau, which relies on various official databases and does occasionally mistake the identities of those they are checking. Obviously I’m talking about a tiny minority here. But even DNA technology is not infallible.

And some people are also worried at how much further these increasingly invasive and sophisticated technologies could go. There are digital CCTV cameras which can give an alert when they think they recognise a face. Computer chips and GPS systems are used to tag and follow those who’ve broken the law. In a pilot scheme in America dozens of elderly people suffering from degenerative diseases have been implanted with chips so their carers can find them easily. How soon before those implants are used here against criminals?  Are we as a society comfortable with what’s going on? Is there enough regulation, or has the use of new technologies in the “war on terror”, gone too far in undermining our democracy and our individual rights?

I believe the UK public would reluctantly put up with these new intrusive technologies, they’d put up with being spied on more, they’d even accept the odd resulting miscarriage of justice, if they believe it’s really helping. They wouldn’t mind what technologies police and MI5 are using if they were convinced it worked. The trouble is they are not always convinced.
 
WHY THE PUBLIC IS SCEPTICAL OF WHAT POLITICIANS SAY ABOUT THE THREAT

Many simply don’t trust the government or believe all they are told about terrorism by politicians and are therefore sceptical about the degree of the threat, and the need for ever more public cash to be spent on new counter-terrorist technologies.

Some in our community, some Muslims, in particular, feel they’re being unfairly targeted, by news technologies and laws aimed at tackling international terrorism. The risk is this will push them away from doing what the intelligence agencies really need them to be do, and that is for them to feel confident enough to give information about suspects who may be hiding in their midst.

The public scepticism, distancing ordinary people from those running the country, is just what the terrorists want – Al Qaeda is playing a sophisticated propaganda war using the latest technologies, in particular internet technologies, to foster mistrust and disunity.

So why this general public mistrust of ministers? In the eyes of many the so called “dodgy dossier” which was used to help justify the war in Iraq, created the biggest dent in public confidence. But the way things like ID cards have been handled has also compounded the problem – one minute we’re told they’re to tackle benefit fraud, then its terrorism, then we’ll need one to get a doctor. No wonder people are confused and sceptical about the motives of politicians.

We are often told we are one of the most watched over societies in the world. I think we    need to be very sure the measures used which are eroding our freedoms and our privacy, really do work against terrorism – and are not just an easy way to check up on a wide range of people for lesser reasons than terrorism. We need to be very sure what’s used has not been introduced for political gain – because the politicians need to sound tough. If you were a police or intelligence officer it would be natural to accept any tool that can help counter terrorism.

But are they all really needed? Look at the recent ITV expose on Birmingham Airport. It’s one thing spending a small fortune on new systems and equipment to stop suspects but if those manning it don’t bother using it then it’s a waste of time and money.

Why does the Home Secretary say he wants to give the police new powers to stop and search terrorist suspects even if there are not obvious grounds for suspicion. They already have this as a special power and they use it frequently. Senior police officers from the Met confirmed this to their police authority less than two weeks, ago. We need to check the motives for new technologies and we need to check if they’ll really bring results. That is the way to convince the public to have confidence in them. 

ROLE OF THE MEDIA

I think it is very important for the media to highlight these things. These are fast changing times, new technologies, new laws and a new threat, we are all feeling our way, and it is new territory for all of us. As journalists we must not simply become a mouthpiece for the establishment. If we report what’s happening without analysis, or without a critical, questioning mind, all sorts of initiatives and laws and technologies could be introduced without the public even knowing. It is all the more important now for us to be watchful and detached, since the policies of all the three main political parties are so close.

I have to say there is every opportunity for us to become extremely close to the authorities. You may think we don’t really know what we’re talking about when we stand in front of the cameras at Ten O’Clock at night and say “The Home Secretary’s done this or a senior police officer’s done that or intelligence sources suggest  x, y and z”. I can assure you that is exactly what they or their closest advisers are saying. The government in particular, is spinning as never before. Bring it on, I say. As a journalist I’ll take all the inside information, all the scoops I possibly can.

BUT – I will NOT take them at face value. When we are briefed you can bet your bottom dollar what’s we’re told has been rubber stamped at the highest level. The job of the special adviser is to push a particular message – and my job is to analyse and where necessary challenge this. And we have to be pretty resilient. You’d be amazed how often a cabinet minister or one of his advisers will phone the Director General of the BBC or an Editor direct, to complain about something that’s on the Six O’clock News, not because it’s inaccurate but because they don’t like the tone. What they’re hoping is they will put pressure on the journalist down the line who has written it, in the hope the slant will change and become more benign by the time it appears on the next high profile bulletin.   

I think the public needs to know this.  The way the past seven years since 9/11 has played out, the handling of the war in Iraq, the way the government largely ignored warnings from military, warnings I heard aired in this very room ahead of the invasion of Iraq, all of this has dented trust in the government.

CONTEMPT

But there is another problem which means that the perception of the threat does not live up to the reality and makes it difficult therefore, for people to understand the need for new technology. I touched on it earlier. Let me here explain more fully.

Those fighting terrorism believe Al Qaeda has changed since 7/7. It is better at avoiding surveillance, more likely to use cell structure, works harder at disguising its links to Pakistan. And it seems it’s trying to use increasingly sophisticated methods to launch attacks. Yet I can’t spell out the reasons for saying this.

That’s because we are severely restricted in our reporting of terrorism and it’s a frustration not just for journalists but for the police, and government and MI5. It means the public perception of the terrorist threat is out of date.

Remember the Crevice plotters, arrested in 2004 and recently jailed for plotting to use conventional, fertiliser based devices to attack civilian targets in London? For nearly two years the intelligence agencies and journalists had known the Crevice plotters had also met two of the July 7 bombers. We had known that those July 7 bombers had been filmed, photographed, followed and recorded by undercover officers from MI5.  Yet the men were never treated as a priority  and more than a year later went on to detonate the London bombs, killing 52 people, and injuring  700. 

Contempt laws meant the British public and more crucially the families of victims of 7/7 were not allowed to know what we the journalists, and lawyers and the security services knew. It meant public understanding of the current threat was incomplete. It also meant the successful operation to prevent the Crevice plot became overshadowed by the failure to prevent 7/7. Having sat on the story for so long the press wasn’t simply going to write and broadcast about the thwarted Crevice plot: they would inevitably focus on how MI5 failed to stop one of Britain’s worst terrorist outrages even though its ringleader had been under surveillance. With all the technology at their fingertips, all the extra cash being ploughed into fighting terrorism, how could they have made such a miss?

THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT IS OLD

What this story also shows is that the public perception of the terrorist threat is old. The reporting of the Crevice story itself, was a story about the about the Al Qaeda of four years ago. The story of MI5’s failure to stop the July 7 attacks is rooted in the activities of the Al Qaeda of two years ago (and for that matter the MI5 of two years ago).  And little can be told to the British public about the threat from al Qaeda now, in 2007, because the media are in effect prevented from doing so. 

Journalists would like people to know about cases waiting to go through the courts because these cases would shed light on the current threat.  In a rare example of common cause the security services would also like this to be the case. However as the law stands it’s impossible for journalists to write about these cases without being seen to prejudice the trials.  The effect of the contempt laws is to prevent the public getting up to date information which would help them assess how great the threat of terrorism is, and how far they should allow politicians to pass new laws and curb civil liberties to tackle it.

In a major speech in April Peter Clarke, head of the police Counter-Terrorism Command, hinted at his frustration. He suggested modern juries could be mature enough to work out for themselves what’s prejudicial and what’s not.

“I understand the difficulties in this” he said, “but I just wonder if we could be bolder and, dare I say it, trust juries to distinguish the prejudicial from the probative”.  Now the Attorney General has said he also thinks juries should be allowed to hear more of the information sooner, so the public gets the information sooner.

If it had not been for the contempt laws the fact MI5 had come across the 7/7 bombers would have become public much earlier. The story of failure then would not have overshadowed Crevice; the success of the police and MI5 in stopping that plot would have dominated coverage at the end of the trial. More importantly the public would not once again be questioning how much they can trust the security services – for have no doubt the delayed revelations about the 7/7 bombers have shaken public confidence as to how much they’re told is true.

And that lack of confidence has been compounded by statements from ministers in all this – so we’re back to the issue of spin. Within days of the horrific attacks of 7/7 ministers were saying the bombers were “clean skins” – people unknown to the security services. In retrospect many people will wonder why they were so quick to say this, and what evidence they had to hand.

For nearly two years these ministerial pronouncements were to the forefront of most people’s understanding of 7/7.  Many people continued to believe the initial statements that the bombers were ‘clean skins’.  When it came, the revelation that this wasn’t the case was, to many deeply shocking, and corrosive to trust.

It all happened years ago. You will know better than me whether Social network Analysis technology,  software which works on identifying suspicious behaviour, would now be more successful at identifying the risk from people like Khan and Tanweer. It didn’t exist or wasn’t doing the job adequately then and the 7/7 attacks went ahead.

We are journalists pushed the perimeters on the Crevice case, but in the interests of playing by the book in order to secure convictions the authorities were quick to clamp down on us.  Very soon after 7/7 the security services realised the bombers were not ‘clean skins’, and that they’d had them on their radar.  Journalists picked up whispers. Just two days after the attacks, on July 9 2005, the Attorney General, citing the contempt laws, warned editors against speculation linking the bombers to terrorist suspects already under arrest.

On January 13 2006, the Judge in the Crevice case issued a court order banning mention of any link between the 7/7 bombers and the Crevice suspects who were by then finally about to be tried.  He was correct to do so - under British law the jurors were not allowed to hear anything which could prejudice their view or undermine the rights of the suspects before them, to a fair, unbiased trial. 

The result of all this was the British public was kept in the dark about the 7/7 bombers for almost two years and about the workings of the Crevice cell for even longer - which brings us back to the contempt laws and people’s perception of the threat. 

If public trust in what the security services say about the Al Qaeda threat is to be re-established either the speed at which trials are heard needs to be vastly increased (unlikely) or Britain has to change its contempt laws.    At the moment the press struggles to write about how the reorganised Al Qaeda of 2007 operates in the UK, because the cases which would illustrate this won’t emerge into court for another two years.

We all understand why we have contempt laws. Yet juries aren’t stupid. If we can trust them to find someone guilty of a charge that will condemn them to life in prison should we not, as Peter Clarke suggests, also trust them to follow evidence they hear in court, rather than press accounts?  After all, many countries – including the US – have very different laws in this area.

Even Shami Chakrabati, Director of the human rights group Liberty, thinks there is room for investigating a cautious loosening of the laws, although she warns, “There’s a balance to be struck between keeping people in the loop in order to retain public confidence, and ensuring cases aren’t tried in the media on rumour and gossip rather than on evidence in court”. 

MI5’s failure to stop the 7/7 plot will always be remembered. And the awkward truth is that if they’d diverted people to monitor Mohammad Sidique Khan back in 2004, we might be bewailing the fact they didn’t stop other attacks. Take the alleged plot to bomb trans-Atlantic aircraft - if that had succeeded intelligence officers claim thousands of people could have been killed.

Nevertheless this issue of public trust must be dealt with. Peter Clarke warns: “It is no exaggeration to say that the lack of public trust in intelligence is in danger of infecting the relationship between the police and the communities we serve….We must maintain that trust”.  Why? Because no amount of new technologies or laws will end the threat, unless law enforcers also have intelligence and much of that will come from the public. One of the people who alerted the police in the Crevice case for example, was some one at the storage unit in West London where the fertiliser was kept.   

Peter Clarke and his colleagues face a tough struggle.  As the delay in revealing the truth about the 7/7 bombers illustrates,  we have the British public kept in the dark but being told the threat is as bad as ever. We have enraged victims who believe they’ve been short changed because they discover vital facts have been kept from them. And we have the police and MI5 frustrated that when rumour and speculation does get out, they can’t answer back or comment.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, if the public knew more, they’d question what’s being suggested to fight terrorism. Why for example is it taking so long to bring in a system to check exactly who is coming into and leaving the country? Crevice, and 7/7 for example taught us that the modern terrorist is likely to travel relatively frequently between here and Pakistan. Now I hear there’s evidence they’re using intermediate staging posts to disguise this. 

The response to the threat may well be proportionate – but the public can’t be certain of that. Many of the technologies being introduced in the name of tackling terrorist  undermine our privacy and liberties, but the people don’t have enough understanding of the threat to know whether that’s justified.

As we move into a new political era, our next leaders will need to make brave decisions on the legal front about the contempt laws, on the technological front about borders and intercept surveillance. Critically, they must also regain public confidence and convince people that whatever they do to fight terrorism, they do it not for any political motive, but because it will keep us all safer in future. 

QUOTE
Last Updated: Friday, 8 July, 2005, 00:48 GMT 01:48 UK

Reporters' Log: London explosions

Margaret Gilmore : Scotland Yard : 2213 BST

There is a strong suspicion amongst security sources I have been speaking to that the bus bomb may well have been carried there by a suicide bomber.

They are investigating the possibility - only a possibility at this stage - that there were other suicide bombers amongst those who planted the bombs on the Underground.

A key question - were they foreign, or home-grown British and thus more difficult to detect?
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Bridget
Posted: Jun 20 2009, 09:10 AM





Group: J7 Admins
Posts: 10,498
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Joined: 26-November 05



QUOTE
From The Times
June 20, 2009

Call for public inquiry into 7/7 from former head of counter-terrorism
Sean O’Neill, Crime and Security Editor

An independent public inquiry should be held into how suicide terrorists were able to carry out the July 7 bombings, Scotland Yard’s former head of counter-terrorism says.

Andy Hayman, who was Assistant Commissioner for Special Operations at the time of the bombings in 2005, is the first figure from the security establishment to break ranks and call for an open inquiry.

Almost four years after Mohammad Sidique Khan and his Leeds-based cell carried out the bombings, Mr Hayman says that he is “uncomfortable” with the official position that an inquiry would divert resources from the fight against terrorism. In his book, The Terrorist Hunters, extracts from which are published in The Times today, Mr Hayman says: “Incidents of less gravity have attracted the status of a public inquiry — train crashes, a death in custody, and even other terrorist attacks. How can there not be a full, independent public inquiry into the deaths of 52 commuters on London’s transport system?

“There has been no overview, no pulling together of each strand of review, no one can be sure if key issues have been missed.”

Survivors of the July 7 bombings and families of the victims are taking High Court action over the refusal to grant them an independent inquiry.

The key issue for any inquiry would be why Khan, 30, who had been photographed, followed and bugged by surveillance officers because of his links with known terrorists, was left free to carry out the attacks.

A report last month by the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) said that MI5’s decision not to make Khan a priority target was “understandable and reasonable”. But that report, prepared by a committee that was appointed by the Prime Minister and took evidence in secret, has been heavily criticised.

It reveals that one MI5 team had begun an operation to identify a suspect known as “Ibrahim”, who was later revealed to be Khan. At the same time, others in MI5 knew where Khan lived but had decided that he was not a key suspect. Critics say that the ISC does not appear to have inquired how the mismatch happened.

In his book, Mr Hayman paints a vivid picture from inside Scotland Yard of the day the bombers struck and admits that the attacks were “a bolt from nowhere”.

He was called to a meeting of Cobra, the Government’s emergency meeting, within an hour of the first explosions, and had to admit that he did not know what was happening.

Mr Hayman writes: “Imagine what it’s like to tell the Commissioner or the Secretary of State, as I would have to, ‘I don’t know what’s going on’.”

Rachel North, a survivor of the Piccadilly Line bomb at King’s Cross, welcomed his support for an inquiry. “It is not to blame or have a witch-hunt but. . . to learn the lessons of how 7/7 happened and whether it could have been prevented.”

• Sir Ian Blair, who as commissioner of the Metropolitan Police was in charge at the time of the London bombings, has received a substantial payoff. He was paid £580,000 during his final eight months in office, more than doubling his annual salary, and stands to benefit from a pension pot of £3.5 million.
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Bridget
Posted: Jun 22 2009, 09:44 AM





Group: J7 Admins
Posts: 10,498
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QUOTE
From The Times
June 22, 2009
Cobra, the UK emergency committee that makes chaos out of a crisis

It should help in emergencies, but slows everything down, says Scotland Yard’s former anti-terror chief in his book

Andy Hayman

Cobra, the Government’s emergency committee for dealing with everything from bird flu to bombs, is a nonsensical system that drags people away from the serious job in hand to attend a crisis meeting.

It slows everything down, making it difficult to respond with immediacy to a crisis and can blur the lines between what’s operational and should be left to the police and other experts and what’s political.

Cobra meets in a windowless room in a fortified cellar beneath Whitehall, between the Houses of Parliament and Trafalgar Square. It’s linked by corridor to Downing Street, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Cabinet Office. Its dramatic name is an acronym for the venue: Cabinet Office Briefing Room A.

On a summer’s day it is a stifling place to be stuck in for several hours — especially when no one knows how to switch on the air-conditioning. The door sticks, whether or not you have the requisite security pass, and like all office kitchens there is milk turning sour in the fridge. It was usually the last place I wanted to be. There’s a bomb attack and all hell breaks loose. Everyone scrambles — emergency services, police, intelligence agencies, government departments — and rushes around trying to deal with it. But within an hour we’re pulled off the job and summoned to Cobra.

Related Links

    * 'I couldn't believe what Blair said on De Menezes'

    * 'Blair was a friend but he became distant'

    * 7/7 bombings were a bolt out of nowhere

Of course a meeting should be called to co-ordinate the response, and the role of senior people is to detach themselves from the detail and plan ahead. But in my experience, Cobra fails to do that. The first time I attended, I was in awe. There were more knights there than at the King Arthur’s Round Table.

But as time went on, I found myself at meetings with a lot of people I’d never set eyes on. It was like being asked to play in a Cup Final with team-mates I had rarely trained with and who in some cases were playing out of position.

At the time of the Haymarket and Glasgow bombs in June 2007, for example, some of the key players had never even entered the Cobra room before, let alone chaired or participated in one of its meetings.

It was not unheard of to find key participants wandering the underground corridors, trying to find out where to go. I’m not talking about when, by a twist of fate, someone finds themselves dealing with a crisis on their first day in a job. That is rare. I’m talking about those who’ve been in a job for a while: surely they should familiarise themselves with Cobra as soon as they are in the role. It’s essential preparation.

Of course politics has a role to play, but political considerations tended to dominate much of the thinking and decision-making when we should have been focused on the operational response to the crisis. Some people felt it more important to make a decision that put them in a good light than one that was truly for the good of the nation.

During the July 2007 crisis, I became increasingly frustrated with Cobra meetings. There was so much jockeying for position, and politics was always close to the surface.
I wondered if politicians should be making these key decisions about terrorism — would you want the chief executive of a hospital to operate on you, or the surgeon?

Take Alistair Darling, who was then Transport Secretary. One minute he’s in a Cabinet meeting discussing Terminal 5, the next he’s in Cobra making decisions about protecting us from terrorism. He was on my case all the time, telling me the Underground needed to be reopened. And I kept asking: “Do you want me to secure the crime scenes and get the evidence to prosecute the terrorists, or do you want me to get the traffic moving?”

I remember wasting precious time during another meeting because we had to explain to a minister why we couldn’t take up their interesting idea of carrying out a forensic examination (gathering untouched evidence) at the same time as doing the clear-up operation (cleaning and clearing the site ready to reopen it to the public).

Sometimes the meetings worked but more often they didn’t. People would jockey for position in front of influential ministers, squabbling over their places at the table. At times Cobra appeared to be little more than a stage for those looking to impress — or a forum where government can be seen to be doing something. I wondered if it was just a photo-opportunity for elected members to be seen walking into the meeting and thus appearing to be in control.

Meanwhile, junior colleagues are out on the front line — some risking their lives — waiting for guidance. I question whether we (the law-enforcers, the emergency responders, the intelligence officers and the investigators) were taken seriously enough.

One Whitehall official told me after a particularly uncomfortable Cobra session meeting: “Mr Hayman, you must remember we are coming to the party with the brains, the cops are simply operational.”

Well, I disagree. It’s time to form a committee in which real experience is the criterion for membership — rather than that you happen to be the elected politician or his or her civil servants. We need something radically different. Leave the politicians and their cronies to get on with general policy making; when it comes to life-and-death decisions we need a body separate from government with the real expertise and knowledge needed to deal with the crisis. This would ensure that the right group of experts comes together, thrashes out the operational imperatives, reach agreement and present specific operational plans to politicians and others at the main meeting.

Cobra could then meet, chaired by a minister or the Prime Minister, to deal not with operational planning but with the political repercussions. It’s surely better to have all the expert opinion sorted and focused in advance, than a free-for-all in which operational chiefs and politicians vie to get in their pennyworth of opinion.

— Terrorist Hunters by Andy Hayman with Margaret Gilmore
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amirrortotheenemy
Posted: Jun 22 2009, 11:39 PM





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Posts: 4,021
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Joined: 6-November 06



QUOTE
The trick is knowing when to intervene and when to wait

Since the atrocities of July 7, 2005, Britain has had to be on full alert in the very real knowledge that an attack by international terrorists could be mounted at any time. When arrests such as those that occurred just before Easter take place, the public holds its breath. Was this the real thing? Or was it the authorities overreacting?

The release without charge of 10 of the 12 suspects will cause public opinion to shift more to the idea that those in power are scaremongering. The view that an attack is a very real possibility will lose credibility.

The difficulty with investigating the threat posed by al-Qaeda, as I found it, is knowing when to make your move. It is one thing to eavesdrop on telephone calls or e-mails. It is a completely different discipline to turn those conversations, which are not admissible in court, into evidence that passes the jury test.

The huge responsibility that goes with the job of fighting terror is judging the balance between when to intervene to stop a possible attack and when to wait, to allow events to unfold so that incriminating evidence can be collected. If you wait too long, there is the danger that public safety is threatened; but waiting that extra hour could be the key to getting the golden nugget that secures a conviction. It is a test of nerve.




The secret is to be in control. Keep the suspects under intensive surveillance and, by doing so, minimise the risk of attack. If the suspects move, you are alongside them. In this case, it appears that the authorities moved to the arrest phase because they thought that an attack was imminent. That was at the expense of waiting a little bit longer to collect evidence, or to establish the lack of it.

Andy Hayman's Blog


QUOTE
Counter-terror role spins too many plates at a time

The mistake made by Bob Quick in allowing a top-secret briefing note to be seen by photographers was out of character for a man who was utterly dependable during his 30-year career.

The nature of the role of counter-terrorism chief means that you can never get on top of the in-tray, simply because there is so much to do. I have been there and experienced the pressure of the job.

This is a perfect time for the powers that be to consider if the job should be done differently. The threat posed by al-Qaeda dwarfs any domestic terror threat faced by any previous holder of the post of Assistant Commissioner Special Operations. Unlike the IRA, the nature of the threat means there is rarely a coded warning and terrorists are willing to sacrifice their own lives in an attack. The international threat is more complex and has a global footprint.

Many Muslim extremists have their sights fixed on the UK, meaning your eyes and ears have to be open and alert across many borders. As if this is not enough, you are also responsible for protecting the Royal Family, foreign diplomats resident in the UK, government ministers, the security of the Palace of Westminster and all counter-terrorism ops in the UK. Also, as a member of the Yard’s management board, you are expected to play your part in running the Met and managing the politics — a wearying task at times.




[b]This is too much for one person. I believe it is not sustainable and that three years from the Olympics the time is right to create a stand-alone counter-terrorism organisation. This would give a single focus for the counter-terrorism boss rather than trying to spin too many plates.

The public profile of the leader should become less prominent, on a par with the head of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency and MI5. Accountability will be the same as these agencies rather than the public airing that is currently experienced.[b/]

After Bob Quick’s resignation we have an opportunity to create a manageable job that will not overburden the officer entrusted with it.

Source


I'll have to watch it again but I don't think Hayman was much in favour of a public inquiry - he said right at the start that there wasn't anything the security services or police would / should have done differently. Tagging Hayman with 'calls for a public enquiry' could be just a vehicle for the desire to set up a specialised agency, which I think will gain traction. I'm betting that if Hayman's ideas do come to fruition they will be a spin-off of the ACPO built on the MI5/Special Branch regional cells.
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